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ABSTRACT
To effectively maintain a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, a plaintiff should plead the elements the
Supreme Court identified in Mt. Healthy to the modern standard of plausibility. This approach is preferable
to the one adopted by the Court in 2019 in Nieves v. Bartlett, which ignored pleading standards and instead
added another element to the cause of action. Under that approach a plaintiff must prove a lack of probable cause
to recover unless she fits into a small exception that is almost impossible to prove. This article reviews Supreme
Court precedent on the retaliatory arrest issue, the circuit split that developed over the same time, and Supreme
Court precedent on pleading standards to argue that the existence of probable cause should not bar a plaintiff’s
claims. Plaintiffs must plead and prove the subjective, retaliatory animus of arresting officers to make their case,
and they should do so plausibly under Twombly.
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INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court adds an element to a cause of action, that
addition inevitably has a ripple effect on the litigation scheme of the claim.
Adding any element impacts every stage of litigation: from the very
beginning stages of pleading, to the gatekeeping of summary judgment, to
trial with jury instructions and judgments as a matter of law. In 2006, the
Supreme Court added an element to retaliatory prosecution claims; it
asserted that plaintiffs must prove a lack of probable cause to advance their
claims. Since then, the circuits have been divided, and the Supreme Court
has been cagey about whether it would extend this element to retaliatory
arrest claims as well. In 2019, the Supreme Court was finally clear that it
would add this element (lack of probable cause) to retaliatory arrest claims
with a small exception. The solution of the Court provides a bar to most
retaliatory arrest claims and precludes recovery for plaintiffs who suffer from
these types of arrests so long as there is even a threadbare, arguable probable
cause to arrest them.
Pleading requirements, especially as those
requirements have also evolved, should color whether a new element is
necessary.
There are two jurisprudential doctrines that have evolved along different
tracks at the same time. The first important historical track is the Court
identifying the necessary elements of a retaliatory arrest cause of action and
the divergence of that claim with the similar claim of retaliatory prosecution.
Part of this historical inquiry must explore Supreme Court precedent over
this time and part of the inquiry must trace how the doctrine has similarly
developed into a sharp circuit split. While the retaliatory arrest doctrine has
been created and expanded, a second historical track had also been
developing as modern pleading standards emerged. Read together, these
two doctrines may symbiotically evolve. As it becomes necessary for plaintiffs
to plead the plausibility of their claims, courts can still preserve the burdenshifting framework of retaliation claims. This outcome would allow a
plaintiff to prove that law enforcement arrested her because of retaliation,
even if there were probable cause for that arrest. In turn, this would provide
a necessary check on abuse of power from police officers and a more factintensive inquiry into the nature of the arrest outside the Fourth Amendment
context.
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I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND
RETALIATORY ARRESTS
The Supreme Court enunciated the elements of retaliatory action against
First Amendment protected speech and created a burden-shifting framework
in 1977 when it decided Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle.1 Mr. Doyle sued the school district after they refused to renew his
contract, claiming in part that the action was in retaliation for protected
speech.2 After wading through jurisdictional and immunity issues in the case,
the Court addressed the merits.3 On the retaliation issue, the District Court
found that the school board illegally based a “substantial part” of its decision
not to rehire Mr. Doyle upon his constitutionally protected speech.4 The
lower court’s causation analysis was an example of “mixed motive” causation
where a mix of motives may cause the retaliation to occur, some permissible
and some impermissible. For the lower court, if any retaliatory animus was
found, that was enough to taint the process and render it unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court objected to this view of causation, explaining
[a] rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct
played a part, “substantial” or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire, could
place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of
constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he
done nothing.5

This type of flawed result led the Court to search for a different test for
causation. The majority cited cases it found illustrative, noting that in other
areas of constitutional law, it had been “necessary to formulate a test of
causation which distinguishe[d] between a result caused by a constitutional
violation and one not so caused.”6 The Court used these cases to establish a
test that simultaneously protected against the invasion of constitutional rights
and prevented unnecessary and undesirable consequences.7

1
2
3
4
5
6

7

429 U.S. 274 (1977).
Id. at 276.
Id. at 281 (“[W]e now proceed to consider the merits of respondent’s claim under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.”).
Id. at 283–84.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 286-87. The Court then cited cases it found to be illustrative: Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S.
596 (1944); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States; 308 U.S.
338 (1939); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
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In the Mt. Healthy case the Court directed the proper burden first on the
plaintiff to show that the constitution protected his conduct and that this
protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor (not merely a factor)
in the decision not to rehire him.8 Once he met that burden, the lower court
should have shifted the burden to the defendant and assessed by a
preponderance of the evidence whether the defendant would have reached
the same decision about employment even without the plaintiff’s protected
conduct.9 The lower court’s error was in not conducting this second part of
the analysis after properly shifting the burden.
This correction of the lower court decision consolidates two key ideas:
first, the Court is identifying and laying out the correct elements of a First
Amendment retaliation claim; and second, the Court is adopting a burdenshifting framework to show the existence of the causation element. The
Court identified the core elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim:
protected speech and retaliatory animus because of that speech that creates an
injury. In the arrest context this would mean that a plaintiff must plead and
prove that (1) she engaged in protected speech, and (2) the officer arrested
her because of that speech. Perhaps the plaintiff might only be able to allege
that retaliatory animus existed and that the injury occurred – those
allegations would still be enough under Mt. Healthy to trigger the burdenshifting framework.
Under the Mt. Healthy approach, once a plaintiff has properly pleaded the
elements, the burden shifts to the defendant to argue that the injury would
have resulted even without the protected speech. Then it is up to a court to
determine, using preponderance of the evidence, whether retaliation caused
the injury. Thus, the retaliatory animus must be the “but-for” cause of the
injury rather than one of many motivating factors. This framework treats
proving lack of but-for causation as an affirmative defense rather than
proving the existence of but-for causation as a prima facie element of the
claim.
The Court also acknowledged that the proper standard for causation was
“but-for” causation. That is, but for the retaliatory animus, the arrest would
not have taken place. In 1989, the Court made this clear when it used the
precedent from Mt. Healthy and observed that “[a] court that finds for a

8
9

Id.
Id.
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plaintiff under this standard [from Mt. Healthy] has effectively concluded that
an illegitimate motive was a “but-for” cause of the employment decision.”10
The Supreme Court altered the elements necessary for a case of
retaliatory prosecution in 2006, almost 30 years after it crafted the Mt. Healthy
framework. In the interim period, a circuit split had grown over whether a
plaintiff must plead and prove lack of probable cause as an element of a
retaliatory prosecution or arrest.11 The Court only decided the prosecution
issue in Hartman v. Moore. 12 The case concerned a Bivens action filed by
Michael Hartman against officers of the federal government that he believed
conspired with the prosecutor to instigate a baseless criminal prosecution
against him in retaliation for his use of free speech.13 The Court narrowed
the issue to “whether a plaintiff in a retaliatory prosecution action must plead
and show the absence of probable cause for pressing the underlying criminal
charges.”14 After acknowledging the current circuit split on whether lack of
probable cause ought to be an element of retaliatory prosecution,15 the Court
determined that plaintiffs would indeed have to plead lack of probable cause.
The government argued that probable cause must be a prima facie
element of a retaliatory prosecution claim because (1) the traditional tort of
malicious prosecution also required a lack of probable cause, and (2)
retaliation was too easy to allege and too difficult to defend against, requiring
an objective component.16 The Court did not mandate a specific common
law tort parallel, stating, “the common law is best understood here more as
a source of inspired examples than of prefabricated components of Bivens
torts.”17 It also suggested that in debating common-law analogs the closer
example might be an abuse of process, which did not require a showing of a
lack of probable cause.18 On the litigation issue, the Court recalled that the
number of retaliatory prosecution cases had been historically small and
evenly split between circuits that required a showing of lack of probable cause

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989).
See, infra III.
547 U.S. 250 (2006).
Id. at 254 n.2. A Bivens action is essentially the federal analog to a § 1983 action.
Id. at 256–57.
Id. at 255–56.
Id. at 257–58.
Id. at 258.
Id.
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and those that did not.19 The Court was ultimately unconvinced on both
points and quickly shifted to discussion of what it saw as the main issue: the
causation problem.
Any plaintiff in a Bivens action or in a § 1983 case for retaliation must
show a causal relationship between animus and injury, but the Court found
the showing of causation more complicated in a prosecution case.20 In a
prosecution case, the Court claimed, there will always be a body of “highly
valuable circumstantial evidence” about the bringing of a criminal charge,
“namely” evidence showing whether there was probable cause to bring it.21
In other words, this evidence will almost always be present as a way for the
plaintiff to prove that retaliation existed—if a plaintiff can show there was no
reason to bring the charge, that alone would reinforce the implication of a
bad act. Moreover, aside from the “powerful evidentiary significance”22 of
the lack of probable cause, the causation itself that the plaintiff would have
to prove is more complex.
The usual reason for requiring but-for causation, the Court explained, is
that “it may be dishonorable to act with an unconstitutional motive and
perhaps in some instances be unlawful, but action colored by some degree of bad
motive does not amount to a constitutional tort if that action would have been taken
anyway.” 23 That said, in a prosecution case, the action is not against the
prosecutor, who is absolutely immune from liability for the decision to
prosecute, but against someone else who may have influenced the
prosecutorial decision.24 This gap in the chain of causation is larger—it “is
not merely between the retaliatory animus of one person and that person’s
own injurious action, but between the retaliatory animus of one person and
the action of another.”25 Evidence must bring those two things together and
the Court admitted that lack of probable cause is “not necessarily
dispositive.”26 Still the Court argued “[t]he issue is so likely to be raised by
some party at some point that treating it as important enough to be an
element will be a way to address the issue of causation without adding to time
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
Id. at 261–62.
Id. at 262.
Id.

1038

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:5

or expense.”27 This view blurs the line between pleading and proof, making
the existence of probable cause outcome determinative no matter how much
evidence there is of retaliatory animus or how scant or spurious the basis for
probable cause.
Justice Ginsburg dissented and Justice Breyer joined in her writing.28 She
reasoned that the Court of Appeals had properly used the burden-shifting
framework from Mt. Healthy v. Doyle.29 The majority of the Court’s reasoning,
however, “saddles plaintiff—the alleged victim—with the burden to plead
and prove lack of probable cause” and would check “only entirely baseless
prosecutions.” 30 This reformulation for the burdens of causation would
provide no costs to would-be retaliators and substantial costs to victims in
reputation and speech, with no ability to find compensation. While
providing this higher barrier to entry for litigation claims of retaliatory
prosecutions, the holding did not suggest it would apply to retaliatory arrests,
which had less complexity in their causal chains.
In 2012, the Supreme Court seemed poised to resolve the renewed circuit
split and answer whether lack of probable cause was a required element of a
retaliatory-arrest claim. Yet in Reichle v. Howards, Justice Thomas focused the
issue on “whether two federal law enforcement agents are immune from suit
for allegedly arresting a suspect in retaliation for his political speech, when
the agents had probable cause to arrest the suspect for committing a federal
crime.”31 As the question hinged on the immunity and not the elements of the
claim, resolving the split was unnecessary.
In Reichle, Steven Howards was at a shopping mall in 2006 where Vice
President Dick Cheney was visiting.32 Dan Doyle, a secret service agent,
overheard Howards say that during the meet and greet he planned to ask the
Vice President how many kids he’d killed that day.33 While meeting with the
Vice President, Howards instead said his policies in Iraq were disgusting and
touched the Vice President’s shoulder before walking away.34 Another secret

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 265.
Id. at 266 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case. Id.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 266–67 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
566 U.S. 658, 660 (2012).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 660–61.
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service agent, Gus Reichle, then asked Howards whether he had touched the
Vice President.35 Howards lied and said he had not.36 After Agent Reichle
confirmed with Agent Doyle that law enforcement had seen Howards
touching the Vice President, he arrested Howards.37 Howards sued both
agents under § 1983 and Bivens, claiming that the agents arrested and
searched him without probable cause and in violation of the First
Amendment.38
The District Court denied a motion for summary judgment on the issue
of whether the officers had qualified immunity.39 On interlocutory appeal,
the Tenth Circuit held that because undisputed probable cause existed for
Howards’ arrest, the Fourth Amendment claim was properly dismissed.40
Even so, this same fact did not defeat the claim for retaliatory arrest, as the
Court of Appeals had precedent that a retaliatory arrest could violate the
First Amendment even if supported by probable cause. 41 Although the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (1) whether a First
Amendment retaliation claim may exist despite probable cause, and (2)
whether that fact was clearly established, it elected to address only the second
issue. 42 The claim was disposed of because the law was not “clearly
established,” and the arresting officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
Howards argued that it was clearly established law that the First
Amendment prohibited retaliatory arrests. But the Court responded that the
right at issue was not “the general right to be free from retaliation for one’s
speech, but the more specific right to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is
otherwise supported by probable cause. This Court has never held that there
is such a right.”43 Moreover, “[a]t the time of Howards’ arrest, Hartman’s
impact on the Tenth Circuit’s precedent governing retaliatory arrests was far
from clear” because “reasonable officers could have questioned whether the

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id. at 661.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 662.
Id.
Id. This is a clear example of a lower court differentiating a Fourth Amendment claim from a First
Amendment claim.
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id. at 665.
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rule of Hartman also applied to arrests.” 44 In fact, the Court distanced
Hartman from arrest claims: “we do not suggest that Hartman’s rule in fact
extends to arrests. Nor do we suggest that every aspect of Hartman’s rationale
could apply to retaliatory arrests.”45 One reason not to extend Hartman logic
to arrests is that the causal connections can be very different. In arrests the
causation is less attenuated because often “it is the [same] officer bearing the
alleged animus who makes the injurious arrest.”46
Through this careful analytical process of leaving the probable cause
element unresolved, the Court noted that the lower court had shown a
misplaced reliance on the Supreme Court precedent of Whren v. United
States.47 In that case, a traffic stop was supported by probable cause but the
Court held that, even so, “the Equal Protection clause would prohibit an
officer from selectively enforcing the traffic laws based on race.”48 The Tenth
Circuit cited specifically to Whren and concluded that “it is well established
that an act which is lawful under the Fourth Amendment may still violate
other provisions of the Constitution.” 49 Yet for purposes of qualified
immunity, the Court now explained that “Whren’s discussion of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not indicate, much less “clearly establish,” that
an arrest supported by probable cause could nonetheless violate the First
Amendment.”50 This explanation seemed to cast doubt on the basic premise
of the holding in Whren, that an arrest may be constitutional under one
provision but unconstitutional under another.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the judgment,
writing that if the defendants had been ordinary law enforcement officers,
qualified immunity should not protect them through Hartman.51 The Hartman
rule for retaliatory prosecution presumed a unique problem of attenuated
causation—imputing the animus of the arresting officer to the prosecutor.
She reasoned that as the “usual retaliatory-arrest case” has “no gap to bridge

44

45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 666. Other courts exacerbated this confusion by applying the Hartman rationale to arrests. Id.
at 669 (citing Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 720 (2006); McCabe v. Parker, 608 F.3d 1068, 1075
(8th Cir. 2010); Phillips v. Irvin, 222 F. Appx. 928, 929 (11th Cir. 2007)).
Id. at 668.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 665 n.5.
Id. (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
Id. (citing Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1149 n.15 (10th Cir. 2011)).
Id.
Id. at 670 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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between one government official’s animus and a second government official’s
action, Hartman’s no-probable-cause requirement is inapplicable.” 52 But
here the secret service agents in question were securing the Vice President’s
physical person, and therefore the Court should not infer retaliatory animus
to their rational actions to protect him.53
In 2018, the Supreme Court tried again and decided the case of Lozman
v. The City of Riviera Beach, Florida.54 Despite repeatedly articulating that the
certified issue of the case was “whether the presence of probable cause bars
[a] retaliatory arrest claim,”55 it ultimately left that question unanswered.
The Court admitted that it had considered this issue in Reichle v. Howards, yet
because the Court decided Reichle on other grounds, the issue remained
unsolved.56
Fane Lozman filed a § 1983 suit against the City of Riviera Beach
contending that city officials “adopted a plan to retaliate against him for
protected speech and then ordered his arrest when he attempted to make
remarks during the public-comment portion of a city council meeting.” 57
The District Court instructed the jury that Lozman had to prove that
retaliatory animus motivated the arresting officer to arrest and that the
officer lacked probable cause to make the arrest.58 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.59 The appellate court assumed that the jury instruction was in
error because it said that the officer, rather than the city, must have held the
improper animus, but ultimately that error was harmless.60 The reason the

52
53
54
55

56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 671 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018).
Id. at 1948 (“This case requires the Court to address the intersection of principles that define when
arrests are lawful and principles that prohibit the government from retaliating against a person for
having exercised the right to free speech.”); id. at 1950-51 (“This Court granted certiorari, on the
issue of whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment claim for retaliatory
arrest under § 1983.”); id. at 1951 (“The question this Court is asked to consider is whether the
existence of probable cause bars that First Amendment retaliation claim.”); id. at 1955 (“The
petition for certiorari asked us to resolve whether ‘the existence of probable cause defeats a First
Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim as a matter of law.’ That question has divided the federal courts
for decades.”) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1951.
Id. at 1949. It was clear that the § 1983 claim was against only the city or municipality based on the
actions of the members of the city council and not the arresting officers. Id. at 1951.
Id. at 1950.
Id.
Id.
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error did not matter was that “under precedents which the Court of Appeals
deemed controlling, the existence of probable cause defeated a First
Amendment claim for retaliatory arrest.”61 Rather than correct or affirm the
Court of Appeals on whether the existence of probable cause was outcome
determinative, the Supreme Court focused instead on the unique facts at
issue.
The Court noted “two major precedents could bear on this point”; that
is, whether lack of probable cause should be an element in retaliatory arrest
claims.62 But the lower courts were split on which precedent should come to
bear: the parties argued whether to apply the Court’s jurisprudence from Mt.
Healthy or Hartman.63
While acknowledging that Mt. Healthy was a civil rather than a criminal
case, the Court described its own holding in relationship to the tort liability
under § 1983. Thus, in that case “the Court held that even if retaliation
might have been a substantial motive for the board’s action, still there was
no liability unless the alleged constitutional violation was a but-for cause of
the employment termination.”64 The City contended in opposition that the
controlling precedent was the more-recent Hartman, when the Court found it
necessary to inquire into probable cause because the link between the
retaliatory animus and the injury is usually more complex.65 The Court took
time to note the “undoubted force” in the City’s position because “it can be
difficult to discern whether an arrest was caused by the officer’s legitimate or
illegitimate consideration of speech.” 66 Even so, “there are substantial
arguments that Hartman’s framework is inapt in retaliatory arrest cases, and
that Mt. Healthy should apply without a threshold inquiry into probable
cause.”67 For example, the causation problem that exists with retaliatory
prosecution was not the same problem that existed in the retaliatory arrest
context and “there is a risk that some police officers may exploit the arrest
power as a means of suppressing speech.”68 Ultimately, and maddeningly,
the Court still concluded that when faced with a retaliatory arrest case,
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
Id. at 1952.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1952–53.
Id. at 1953.
Id.
Id.
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whether “the Hartman approach should apply, thus barring a suit where
probable cause exists, or, on the other hand, the inquiry should be governed
only by Mt. Healthy is a determination that must await a different case.”69
In Lozman’s case, because his claim against the city hinged on a finding
of a specific, official policy for arrest, it was “separate[] . . . from the typical
retaliatory arrest claim.”70 These types of claims did not require a petitioner
to prove the lack of probable cause and could instead easily default to Mt.
Healthy analysis.71
Justice Thomas penned the single dissent, exhibiting frustration with the
Court for not answering a question that has “divided the federal courts for
decades” and “widened” since the holding in Reichle.72 Thomas framed the
majority’s rule as having five conditions necessary to trigger it: (1) an official
policy of intimidation, (2) the policy must exist before the arrest, (3) objective
evidence of the policy must exist, (4) there can be little relationship between
the protected speech that prompted the policy and the criminal offense that
triggers the arrest, and (5) the protected speech must be valuable in the
context of the First Amendment.73 He noted that even Lozman’s case was
not a good fit for these long and cumbersome requirements.74
While Justice Thomas did not believe that Congress embedded any First
Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim in § 1983,75 if one existed he would hold
that any plaintiff bringing such a claim must plead and prove a lack of
probable cause.76 As courts have repeatedly cited § 1983 as a source of a
species of tort liability, he compared a retaliatory arrest claim to the three
closest analogs in common-law torts: false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, and malicious arrests.77 In all three cases, “the common law
recognized probable cause as an important element for ensuring that arrestbased torts did not unduly interfere with the objectives of law enforcement.”78
Because “police officers need the safe harbor of probable cause in the First
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 1954.
Id.
Id. at 1955. The Court was clear that it “need not, and does not, address the elements required to
prove a retaliatory arrest claim in other contexts.”
Id. at 1955 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1956 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1956 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1956 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1956-57 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1958 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Amendment context to be able to do their jobs effectively” and often
exchange words with a suspect before arrest, claims that did not allege a lack
of probable cause “would permit plaintiffs to harass officers with the kind of
suits that common-law courts deemed intolerable.”79
In May 2019, the Supreme Court decided Nieves v. Bartlett, and while it
answered part of the question about whether lack of probable cause was an
element to a retaliatory arrest action, the opinions raised even more questions
about the issue.80 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, joined
by Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Justice Thomas partially
joined the opinion and filed a separate concurrence. Justice Gorsuch and
Justice Ginsburg filed separate opinions to concur in part and dissent in part
while Justice Sotomayor firmly dissented.
Russell Bartlett sued his two arresting officers, alleging that his arrest was
retaliatory.81 The officers argued that they had probable cause to arrest him
and that this fact defeated his claim entirely.82 Bartlett, at the time of the
arrest, was attending a festival in Alaska known for “extreme sports and
extreme alcohol consumption.”83 There was some dispute over the factual
details of the arrest, but the Court found the parties to agree “on the general
course of events” that led to the arrest.84 Officer Nieves asked some festival
attendants to move a beer keg into their RV because minors had been
making off with alcohol, and Bartlett intervened, directing the RV owners
not to talk to the officer.85 When Officer Nieves approached Bartlett directly,
he either was drunk and belligerent or merely refused to speak to the officer.86
Later, Bartlett saw another police officer, Trooper Weight, speaking to a
minor about whether he had been drinking.87 Again, Bartlett intervened,
and stood close to Trooper Weight.88 Officer Nieves, seeing this interaction,
initiated the arrest and possibly said to him, “[b]et you wish you would have

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. at 1958 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019).
Id. at 1718.
Id.
Id. at 1720.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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talked to me now.” 89 Bartlett was charged with disorderly conduct and
resisting arrest and released a few hours later.90
The criminal charges against him were dismissed, but Bartlett sued the
officers under § 1983 for retaliatory arrest.91 He claimed that his protected
speech was the refusal to speak with Officer Nieves earlier in the evening and
his intervention with Trooper Weight and the minor.92 The officers claimed
that “they arrested Bartlett because he interfered with an investigation and
initiated a physical confrontation with [Trooper] Weight,” and thus had
probable cause to do so.93 The District Court granted summary judgment
for the officers, finding “the existence of probable cause precluded [a] First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.” 94 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
claiming that Bartlett needed to show that the officers’ conduct would chill
an ordinary person from future First Amendment activity and the officers’
desire to chill speech was a “but-for” cause of his arrest.95 If a jury believed
Bartlett’s allegation about what Officer Nieves had said, it might conclude
that the officers arrested Bartlett in retaliation for his statements earlier that
night, which was enough to overturn summary judgment.96
The Court tackled whether probable cause defeated a claim for
retaliatory arrest by first acknowledging that it had left that very question
unanswered in both Reichle v. Howards and Lozman v. Riviera Beach.97 That said,
while the Court had placed distance between retaliatory prosecution and
retaliatory arrest previously by refusing to directly extend Hartman,98 in Nieves
the Court used it as the first cited case in the analysis.99 The majority used it
to support the proposition that the First Amendment prohibits government
89

90
91
92
93
94
95

96
97
98
99

Id. at 1721. There was also a claim that Bartlett was slow to comply with the arrest, so the officers
in tandem forced him to the ground and threatened to tase him. Id. His explanation of slow
compliance was he did not want to aggravate an existing back injury. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The Ninth Circuit relied on its own precedent, holding that a plaintiff can prevail on a First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim even if the arrest had probable cause. Id. (citing Ford v.
Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2013)).
Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1721.
Id. at 1721–22.
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1953 (2018); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S.
658, 668 (2012).
Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722.
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officials from retaliatory actions against those engaging in protected speech,
and pulled the “but-for” analysis from that case, using Mt. Healthy as a mere
“example” of this phenomenon.100 The Court then re-explained the logic
from Hartman, recalling the issue of complex causation and the solution of
requiring plaintiffs to plead and prove a lack of probable cause as a prima
facie element of the claim.101 The Court reminded that “Hartman requires
plaintiffs in retaliatory prosecution cases to show more than the subjective
animus of an officer and a subsequent injury; plaintiffs must also prove as a
threshold matter that the decision to press charges was objectively unreasonable
because it was not supported by probable cause.” 102 This brand-new
injection of subjective and objective language into the Hartman holding where
there had been no mention of it set the stage for all of the analytical work to
follow.103
The first step in the majority’s chain of reasoning was to close the gap
between retaliatory prosecutions and arrests that the Court had widened.
The Court reversed course on causation because “retaliatory arrest claims
involve causal complexities akin to those we identified in Hartman, and thus
warrant the same requirement.”104 The Court cited several reasons for the
complexity of the causal inquiry of retaliatory arrests: including speech as a
legitimate consideration for arrests, the split-second judgments officers must
make, and the possibility that the content and manner of a suspect’s speech
may contain vital information for an officer. 105 As a result, the Court
contended that the presence or absence of probable cause would be available

100
101
102
103

104
105

Id.
Id. at 1722–1723.
Id. at 1723 (emphasis added).
The words objective and subjective do not appear in the Court’s formulation of the requirement in
Hartman. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265–66 (2006) (“Because showing an absence of
probable cause will have high probative force, and can be made mandatory with little or no added
cost, it makes sense to require such a showing as an element of a plaintiff’s case, and we hold that
it must be pleaded and proven.”). While there is some mention of the objective/subjective
terminology, it is framing the parties’ arguments and not the Court’s reasoning. Id. at 257 (“The
inspectors argue on two fronts that the absence of probable cause should be an essential element.
Without such a requirement, they first say, the Bivens claim is too readily available. A plaintiff can
afflict a public officer with disruption and expense by alleging nothing more, in practical terms,
than action with a retaliatory animus, a subjective condition too easy to claim and too hard to defend
against.”) (emphasis added); Id. at 257 (“In the inspectors’ view, some objective burden must be
imposed on these plaintiffs, simply to filter out the frivolous.”) (emphasis added).
Nieves,139 S. Ct. at 1723 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1723–24.
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in virtually every case and provide weighty evidence one way or the other.106
Even though arrests are not subject to a presumption of regularity or
necessarily involve multiple government actors (like prosecutions), causation
is still “particularly difficult.”107 Because the causes of action were closely
related in this area of complex causation, the same solution was required:
“the plaintiff pressing a retaliatory arrest claim must plead and prove the
absence of probable cause for the arrest.”108 The Court straightforwardly
presented this analogy, but with zero real explanation as to why the Court
had carefully separated the concepts of retaliatory prosecution and arrest
since at least 2006 with Hartman, only to throw up its hands and call them
inextricably linked in 2019.
The Court identified the “problem” with these claims as the same, in that
“it is particularly difficult to determine whether the adverse government
action was caused by the officer’s malice or the plaintiff’s potentially criminal
conduct.”109 Still, it does not follow that a similar difficulty of proof means
that the correct solution in both cases is that the plaintiff must simply prove
lack of probable cause. In creating a prima facie element requirement and
injecting this through the summary judgment standard, the Court really
deprives a jury from determining the thorny factual causation issue. A jury
should be able to (or at least allowed to) determine whether an officer’s malice
or the plaintiff’s potentially criminal conduct actually caused the arrest. At
that point it seems to be more a matter of fact than a matter of law.
The next step in the Court’s reasoning insisted that because courts usually
analyze arrests through an objective lens under Fourth Amendment analysis,
courts must also analyze arrests through an objective lens under First
Amendment analysis. The majority affirmed that “[i]n the Fourth Amendment
context, however, we have almost uniformly rejected invitations to probe
subjective intent . . . [a] particular officer’s state of mind is simply irrelevant
and it provides no basis for invalidating an arrest.”110 The Court also argued
that it must resist a subjective inquiry into intent that would “set-off broadranging discovery in which [there often would be] no clear end to the
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at 1724.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1724–25 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 737 (2011), and Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146, 153, 155 (2004)). This is certainly the well-established rule under the Fourth
Amendment but does not answer what is required under the First Amendment.
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relevant evidence.”111 The Court alleged that a subjective standard would
chill law enforcement from making arrests, compromise evenhanded
application of the law, and even chill law enforcement communication
during arrests.112
The Court then concluded, without connecting the dots in any way, that
because Hartman’s no-probable-cause rule would address these concerns
about future litigation and arrests, it was the appropriate standard.113 It is
only if the plaintiff can establish a lack of probable cause that the Mt. Healthy
standard would be appropriate. Still, it is unclear why the Mt. Healthy
standard would even be helpful at that point; if the plaintiff can prove a lack
of probable cause for the arrest what other reason could there be other than
retaliation or some other impermissible motive? 114 By suggesting that
inquiry into subjectivity is inappropriate when there is probable cause but
appropriate when there is no probable cause transmogrifies the First
Amendment inquiry into a Fourth Amendment one. Moreover, the sudden
resistance to a subjective inquiry for a retaliatory arrest claim is exasperating.
The essence of a retaliatory arrest is that it occurred for subjective reasons: that
is, it would not have occurred but for the subjective, inappropriate, and
retaliatory animus of the government actor.
The third step in the Court’s reasoning again turned to the analogy of
tort law to gain elements for retaliatory arrest under § 1983. As there was no
common law tort for retaliatory arrest based on protected speech, the parties
argued over whether false imprisonment or malicious prosecution was a
better fit. 115 That said, the Court asserted that the presence of probable
cause would defeat either cause of action, and so the presence of probable
cause should also prevent a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.116

111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 1725 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982)).
Id.
Id.
An arrest without probable cause would also already be obviously unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.
Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1726.
Id. As historical reference, the Court notes that malicious prosecution required the plaintiff to show
that the criminal charge was unfounded or made without probable cause and that for claims of false
imprisonment the presence of probable cause was generally a complete defense for peace officers.
Id. This sentiment also ignores the Court’s earlier analysis from Hartman that abuse of power, which
did not require lack of probable cause, was a possible candidate, and that common-law tort claims
should not thought of as “prefabricated components of . . . torts.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S.
250, 258 (2006).

December 2021] MODERN PLEADING STANDARDS AS A BLUEPRINT

1049

Taking an unexpected turn in analysis, the majority’s final section (which
is the section not assented to by Justice Thomas) carved out a “narrow
qualification” for the rule that they had just announced.117 This qualification
was for “circumstances where officers have probable cause to make arrests,
but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.”118 The majority yielded
this ground because it found a “risk that some police officers may exploit the
arrest power as a means of suppressing speech,”119 which, some may argue,
is the entire reason to have a restriction against retaliatory arrests in the first
place. The example the Court gave was of an individual vocally complaining
about the police who the police later arrested for jaywalking.120 The Court
admitted that “[i]n such a case, because probable cause does little to prove
or disprove the causal connection between animus and injury, applying
Hartman’s rule would come at the expense of applying Hartman’s logic.”121
Yet the very next sentence explained that “[f]or those reasons, we conclude that
the no-probable-cause requirement should not apply when a plaintiff
presents objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly
situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not
been.” 122 The majority believed that because this would be “objective
evidence” of pretextual arrest; it did not violate the earlier mandate to view
retaliatory arrest claims on an objective rather than subjective basis.123 That
said, even the given example of the jaywalker would fail unless she could
provide concrete evidence of other similarly situated jaywalkers who went
unprosecuted and did not engage in protected speech. 124 This is a
fundamental problem of whether lack of probable cause as an element is a

117
118
119
120
121
122

123

124

Id. at 1727-28.
Id. at 1727.
Id. (quoting Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1953–54 (2018)).
Id.
Id.
Id. Here, the majority cites United States v. Armstrong, which Justice Gorsuch clings to as
expanding this “narrow qualification” in his concurrence. Id. at 1727, 1730, 1733–1734 (citing
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996)).
Id. at 1727. The Court says, “[b]ecause this inquiry is objective, the statements and motivations of
the particular arresting officer are ‘irrelevant’ at this stage.” Id. This is false, however, because the
challenge for the plaintiff is to use this “objective” evidence so that she has a chance to argue about
the improper subjective motive of the officer.
The majority does not clarify what this exception would look like in practice. Would the jaywalker
need to identify other jaywalkers at the time of her arrest? Or overall at other times? Would not
this objective evidence come at the price of expensive discovery into the process of law enforcement,
the very thing the majority is seeking to avoid?
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hard-stop question of law or whether it is a balancing and weighted factual
inquiry. If it is a hard stop, then a jury will almost never be able to consider
situations in which the arrest was supported by probable cause, but
retaliatory animus was still the but-for cause of the arrest. The exception, of
course, is for when a plaintiff can show “objective” evidence of “similarly
situated individuals.” But what if there are no similarly situated individuals?
What if the officer looks the arrestee in the eye and admits that arrest is for
retaliatory animus but “it’s a good thing I also have probable cause”?125 Are
such claims dead in the water? The majority was far from clear, but the
answer seemed weighted toward a requirement for lack of probable cause as
a prima facie element necessary for retaliatory arrest claims.126 It makes little
sense to draw a hard line and then create an almost nonsensical and ill-drawn
exception.
This exception is, of course, why Justice Thomas did not join on to this
last portion of the majority opinion. He wrote that the qualification “has no
basis in either the common law or [the Court’s] First Amendment
precedents.”127 This position emanates from a comparison to the common
law in place when Congress enacted § 1983.128 He quoted the majority from
Lozman explaining that “the common law recognized probable cause as an
important element for ensuring that arrest-based torts did not unduly
interfere with the objectives of law enforcement.” 129 Justice Thomas
considered false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and malicious arrest
and found that “[t]he existence of probable cause generally excused an
officer from liability from these three torts, without regard to the treatment

125

126

127
128
129

In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor gives the example of a reporter investigating corruption in a police
unit. An officer from that unit follows the reporter until she exceeds the speed limit by five miles
per hour, then delivers a steep ticket and an explicit message: “Until you find something else to
write about, there will be many more where this came from.” Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1741 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting). She suggests that this evidence would be irrelevant under the majority’s rule and the
reporter would have no claim of retaliation. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
In fact, for Bartlett’s case, the Court determines succinctly that it cannot succeed “because [the
officers] had probable cause to arrest him . . . his retaliatory arrest claim fails as a matter of law.”
Id. at 1728. There seems to be no room here for him to amend his claim to include other festival
goers in similar situations who the police did not arrest but also engaged in protected speech, should
there be any.
Id. at 1728 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Lozman, 138 S. Ct. at
1958).
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of similarly situated individuals.” 130 To Justice Thomas, this historical
evidence ended the matter, and the “majority’s exception lacks the support
of history, precedent, and sound policy.”131
Justice Thomas argued that the majority imported its qualification from
selective-prosecution claims in United States v. Armstrong.132 He pointed out
that selective-prosecution claims rely on equal protection standards and not
First Amendment standards and a court cannot transmute these standards.
For this proposition he cited Whren v. United States for the language that states
“the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause.”133 Yet he did not refer
to the Court’s holding that an arrest permissible on Fourth Amendment
grounds may be impermissible on other constitutional grounds. His rule
would completely overlay Hartman and retaliatory prosecutions onto
retaliatory arrests and require a lack-of-probable-cause element for both.
Justice Gorsuch filed a separate opinion, concurring in part with the
majority and dissenting in part. His opinion opened with the notion that the
parties agreed on two concepts: (1) that an officer can violate someone’s First
Amendment rights by arresting her in violation of her protected speech and
(2) the presence of probable cause does not undo that violation or erase its
significance.134 While he may be right on the second point, it seems that the
majority and the officers did believe that the existence of probable cause mostly
does undo at least liability for any such violation. Justice Gorsuch went to the
text of § 1983 to begin his analysis by searching for a linguistic hook for the
elements of retaliatory arrest in the statute. Finding none, he commented
that you can “look at that statute as long as you like and you will find no
reference to the presence or absence of probable cause as a precondition or
defense to any suit.” 135 To be fair, there is no language to be found
specifically about retaliatory arrest either, as the section is only 145 words
and critically provides relief to:

130
131
132
133
134

135

Id. at 1728–1729 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1730.
Id. at 1729 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
Id. at 1730 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is not clear that the parties
do agree on this, with the officers and the majority using lack of probable cause as a barrier to a
cause of action for retaliatory arrest.
Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .136

With no language to guide the way, Justice Gorsuch also looked to the
common law that was in place when Congress adopted the statute to help
divine the legislature’s intent. 137 At that time, courts could not hold law
enforcement agents who made a lawful arrest liable for the torts of false arrest
or false imprisonment, but those agents also usually needed warrants to make
arrests.138 Now, more warrantless arrests occur as long as there is probable
cause to believe a crime has been committed, so it does not follow for Justice
Gorsuch that probable cause should be a bar to recovery.139 The point of
the common law claims, he explained, was to remedy arrests and
imprisonments effected without lawful authority.140 For that reason, probable
cause should defeat a claim that an arrest occurred without legal authority,
a proper Fourth Amendment claim. In contrast, the point of a First
Amendment claim “isn’t to guard against officers who lack lawful authority
to make an arrest. Rather, it’s to guard against officers who abuse their
authority by making an otherwise lawful arrest for an unconstitutional
reason.”141 The First and Fourth Amendments, explicitly and intentionally,
offer different protections.142 The Fourth protects against unlawful authority
for arrests. The First protects the freedom of speech.
As an example of these different constitutional protections, Justice
Gorsuch pointed to other Supreme Court precedent: Yick Wo v. Hopkins and
Whren v. United States.143 In the first case, police jailed Chinese immigrants for
operating coin laundries without permits with no similar actions against

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1730–31 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1731 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.

December 2021] MODERN PLEADING STANDARDS AS A BLUEPRINT

1053

Caucasian owners. 144 This violated the Fourteenth Amendment, even if
there were probable cause to believe the Chinese immigrants had broken the
law.145 In the second case, racially selective arrests were taking place and this
too violated equal protection guarantees.146 In implementing this holding,
the lower courts have explicitly said: “simply because a practice passes muster
under the Fourth Amendment . . . does not mean that unequal treatment
with respect to that practice is consistent with equal protection.”147 While
this is a compelling reading of Whren, the Court had explicitly disavowed this
reading as clearly established in Reichle, calling the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning
misplaced and instead stated that the case’s “discussion of Fourteenth
Amendment d[id] not indicate . . . that an arrest supported by probable
cause could nonetheless violate the First Amendment.”148 As a result, it was
not the common ground that Justice Gorsuch believed it to be. In adopting
probable cause as a bar to relief in most cases, the majority did in fact equate
lawfulness under the Fourth Amendment with lawfulness under the First.
While Justice Gorsuch did not believe the presence of probable cause to
be outcome determinative, neither did he believe it to be “entirely irrelevant
to the analysis.”149 He explained that it may “bear on the claim’s viability in
at least two ways that warrant explanation in future cases.” The first of these
was causation, where that causation might be a question for the jury to
determine, given any number of plausible reasons why retaliation triggered
the arrest instead of probable cause.150 He pointed out that if there was
144

145
146
147
148

149
150

Id. (Gorsuch concurring and dissenting) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). Scholars
consider this to be a foundational immigration law case that extended equal protection to foreign
nationals located geographically inside the United States. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Unexplainable on
Grounds of Race: Doubts about Yick Wo, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (“Yick Wo v. Hopkins is . . .
celebrated as a classic equal protection case. . . .”).
Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
Id. at 1731 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Hedgepeth v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 386 F.3d 1148, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 n.5 (2012). While this case was heard during then Judge
Gorsuch’s term on the Tenth Circuit, he was not one of the presiding judges. See Howards v.
McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting that Tenth Circuit Judges Kelly,
Seymour, and Lucero presided over this case).
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1732 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
See id. (noting that if the officer “couldn’t identify a crime for which probable cause to arrest existed”
or claimed that probable cause rested on a “minor infraction” that would not “normally trigger an
arrest,” a jury may question whether retaliation led to an arrest).
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probable cause to think the plaintiff committed a serious crime that “would
nearly always trigger an arrest regardless of speech” then generally that case
could likely be dismissed on the pleadings or through summary judgment.151
He also argued that Hartman was a different case and it was “equally clear
that its reasoning did not extend to ‘ordinary retaliation claims, where the
government agent allegedly harboring the animus is also the individual
allegedly taking the adverse action.’”152
The second issue for Justice Gorsuch was whether “probable cause may
play a role in light of the separation of powers and federalism.”153 In United
States v. Armstrong, the Court held that “to respect the separation of powers
and federalism, a plaintiff must present ‘clear evidence’ of discrimination
when a federal or state official possesses probable cause to support his
prosecution.” 154 That case dealt with racially selective prosecutions that
could violate the Equal Protection clause even if they complied with probable
cause and the Fourth Amendment. The Court in that case said that this clear
evidence looked like evidence of a prosecutor failing to charge similarly
situated persons or direct admissions of discriminatory purpose. 155 The
majority in Nieves imported one of these exceptions without the other, and
gave no language leaving the door open to any other exceptions. 156 Even so,
because the majority included a citation to only Armstrong in announcing its
exception, Gorsuch “retain[ed] hope” that lower courts would apply the
decision “commonsensically, and with sensitivity to competing arguments
about whether and how Armstrong might apply in the arrest setting.”157 Given
the text of the majority’s holding, his hope seems misplaced.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a very brief opinion concurring in part of the
judgment and dissenting in part. She asserted that because police may abuse
their arrest authority, “[i]f failure to show probable cause defeats an action

151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id. In this way, lack of probable cause as an element is not the only way to perform a gatekeeping
function against trivial claims.
Id. at 1733 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547
U.S. 250, 260 (2006)).
Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517
U.S. 456, (1996)).
Id.
Id. at 1715 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
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under § 1983, only entirely baseless arrests will be checked.” 158 Justice
Ginsburg would continue to follow the precedent laid out in Mt. Healthy,
when the plaintiff alleges retaliation was a motivating factor in the arrest and
then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that even without any
impetus to retaliate, the defendant would have arrested the plaintiff.159 In
the case at issue, the plaintiff did not allege retaliatory animus for Trooper
Weight and only some evidence existed in Sergeant Nieves’ statement of “bet
you wish you would have talked to me now.”160 That said, Justice Ginsburg
would not “use this thin case to state a rule that will leave press members and
others exercising First Amendment rights with little protection against police
suppression of their speech.”161
Justice Sotomayor dissented but started with the common ground that
eight justices seemed to share; the existence of probable cause should not
always defeat a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. 162 She noted,
“[t]here is no basis in § 1983 or in the Constitution to withhold a remedy for
an arrest that violated the First Amendment solely because the officer could
point to probable cause that some offense, no matter how trivial or obviously
pretextual, has occurred.”163 The correct approach; however, would be to
apply the “well-established, carefully calibrated standards that govern First
Amendment retaliation claims” and not to use the majority’s slim exception
that “risks letting flagrant violations go unremedied.”164
This careful calibration stems from the Mt. Healthy precedent, in which
the plaintiff must establish that constitutionally protected conduct was a
substantial or motivating factor in the challenged action, shifting the burden
to the government actor to prove that the decision would have occurred
regardless of the protected conduct.165 This “timeworn standard is by no

158

159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is similar to her contention in
Hartman. 547 U.S. 250, 266–67 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that saddling the plaintiff
with the burden of pleading and proving lack of probable cause checks “only entirely ‘baseless
prosecutions’”) (citation omitted).
Id. at 1735 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. Thus, she would dismiss the claim against Trooper Weight and thinks it possible that Nieves
would still prevail on summary judgment.
Id.
Id. at 1735 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1736 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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means easily satisfied,” 166 which should alleviate the worries about excess
litigation or protracted discovery. If there is “sufficient evidence of
retaliatory motive and sufficiently weak evidence of probable cause . . . Mt.
Healthy is surmountable.”167
It is the majority’s oddly crafted exception that worried Justice
Sotomayor the most because it “arbitrarily fetishizes one specific type of
motive evidence—treatment of comparators—at the expense of other modes
of proof.”168 This would mean that “[p]laintiffs who would rely on other
evidence to prove a First Amendment claim would be out of luck, even if they
could offer other, unassailable proof of an officer’s unconstitutional
‘statements and motivations.’”169 At the very least, “[p]laintiffs should have
a meaningful opportunity to prove such claims when they arise,” and a
procedural bar of this magnitude would never provide that opportunity.170
Even inside this exception, “[w]hat exactly the Court means by ‘objective
evidence,’ ‘otherwise similarly situated’ and ‘the same sort of protected
speech’ is far from clear.”171 This lack of clarity makes the narrow exception
even harder to apply. And while the majority spent “much of its opinion . .
. analogizing to Hartman and to common-law privileges . . . that reasoning is
not sound.” 172 Although the causation from animus to arrest might be
complex, “[t]hat is true of most unconstitutional motive claims, yet we
generally trust that courts are up to the task of managing them.”173 She
argued that trials on this point are rare and even accepting that on occasion
“a police officer who made a legitimate arrest might have to explain that
arrest to a jury . . . is insufficient reason to curtail the First Amendment.”174
Again, this is a crucial point; the jury should be involved in a fact-based
inquiry, while the majority relegates not pleading lack of probable cause as
decisive as a matter of law. The majority “shortchanges that hard-earned
wisdom [of First Amendment protection] in the name of marginal
convenience.”175
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id.
Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1739 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1736 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1741 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1737 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1737–38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1742 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Even if these more practical concerns were valid, Justice Sotomayor
asserted they are no reason for “the Court’s mix-and-match approach to
constitutional law” that creates a “Frankenstein-like constitutional tort that
may do more harm than good.” 176 She noted that in Whren, the Court
explained that while “‘subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,’ that does not make evidence
of an officer’s ‘actual motivations’ any less relevant to claims of ‘selective
enforcement’ under the Equal Protection Clause.” 177 Both an Equal
Protection claim and a First Amendment claim require an inquiry into the
motives of an official, and require a separate analysis from any Fourth
Amendment irregularities.178 In these other contexts, “when the ultimate
question is why a decisionmaker took a particular action, the Court considers
the decisionmakers’ own statements (favorable or not) to be highly relevant
evidence.”179 So why not here? Instead, the “comparison-based evidence is
the sole gateway through the probable-cause barrier that [the majority]
otherwise erects.”180
As to Justice Gorsuch’s hope that a future court could borrow a clear
evidence rule from United States v. Armstrong to allow other evidence to
overcome a lack of probable cause, Justice Sotomayor is unconvinced.181
Borrowing this principle would take a doctrine about equal protection in a
criminal proceeding with prosecutors and smashing that into a context of
First Amendment principles in a civil suit with police officers.182 That would
be far more complex remedy than merely using the already available, already
relevant, already proven approach of Mt. Healthy.183
II. CIRCUIT COURT SPLITS OVER RETALIATORY ARREST ELEMENTS
To understand the trajectory of circuit-level case law while the Supreme
Court was developing its jurisprudence in the area of retaliatory arrests, a

176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id. at 1738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1739 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
Id. at 1740 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1741–42 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1742 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
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review of relevant case law is necessary.184 Before Nieves, four circuits: the
Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh, found that the existence of probable
cause would bar recovery on a retaliatory arrest claim. Conversely, two
circuits, the Ninth and Tenth, found that probable cause was not a bar. Five
circuits never squarely answered the inquiry because of intervening issues of
qualified immunity or the fact that plaintiffs continually argued a lack of
probable cause anyway. Lastly, the Sixth Circuit showed the most change
over time in line with changing Supreme Court precedent, but it also
extended Hartman to arrests before commanded to by Nieves. Interestingly,
the circuits that allowed cases to proceed despite the existence of probable
cause saw no more cases than those who barred such actions.185 In fact, the
Eighth Circuit, which barred such claims outright, had the most cases.186
Before breaking down each circuit, it is necessary to explain the overlap
of qualified immunity with many of these cases. Arrested plaintiffs who
experience a violation of their constitutional rights can directly challenge the
criminal action but can also mount a suit through Bivens or § 1983 against
federal or state officers respectively for damages they have accrued. 187
Qualified immunity protects these federal or state officers from the suit itself
“unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory
or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the
time of the challenged conduct.”188 Courts need not resolve the two-step
protocol in order, and “[t]he judges of district courts and the courts of
appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”189
184

185

186
187
188
189

This search was performed using Westlaw using the following search protocol: (adv: “first
amendment” /p “retaliat!” /p “arrest” /p “probable cause”). All cases were read and evaluated
for relevancy. Eighty-six reported, relevant cases were identified across twelve circuits. Many cases
included claims for lack of probable cause and made parallel First and Fourth Amendment claims,
which required no other analysis on the need for the lack of probable cause for a claim. During the
editing phase later cases were added that cited to Nieves that are not included in the initial count.
Forty cases were found in circuits that barred claims and only seventeen in circuits that did not bar
claims. Sixteen were found in circuits that had not resolved the issue, and thirteen were found in
the Sixth Circuit which changed over time.
Seventeen cases were found in the Eighth Circuit.
See 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
8388 (2d ed. 1998) (describing Bivens actions).
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)).
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
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As a result, if a court finds that the issue of whether probable cause bars
recovery is unclear, it can use that to find that the right was not “clearly
established” and provide qualified immunity whether or not it can determine
that a constitutional violation occurred. For example, the Second Circuit
noted “[f]ew issues related to qualified immunity have caused more ink to be
spilled than whether a particular right has been clearly established, mainly
because courts must calibrate, on a case-by-case basis, how generally or
specifically to define the right at issue.”190 If the issue is whether a reasonable
officer “‘could have believed that [the challenged conduct] was within the
bounds of appropriate police responses,’ the defendant officer is entitled to
qualified immunity.”191 For many lower courts, once the Supreme Court
announced in Reichle that it had never been clear about whether a right to be
free from an arrest supported by probable cause existed and then refused to
articulate whether such a right existed, the issue was effectively terminated.
Many courts require a plaintiff to cite Supreme Court or circuit precedent to
prove that a right was clearly established. 192 The Supreme Court never
explicitly granted this right, and many circuits skirted the issue (so it was
unclear) or did not recognize the right at all.
The first category of circuits, those who barred claims based on probable
cause, doubled down on this bar with evolving Supreme Court support. The
Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits used probable cause as a proxy
for causation analysis before the Supreme Court even decided Hartman in
2006.
The Second Circuit, in 1992, found in a prosecution case that “because
there was probable cause . . . to believe that [the plaintiff] violated the
harassment statute” there was no need to “examine the defendant’s motives
in reporting [the plaintiff’s] actions to the police for prosecution.”193 Just a
few years later, in 1995, the court explicitly applied this holding to the arrest

190
191
192

193

Golodner v. Berliner, 770 F.3d 196, 205 (2d Cir. 2014).
Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 389 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 208 (2001)).
See e.g., A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1134–35 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting that a plaintiff must
“identify[] an on-point Supreme Court or published Tenth Circuit decision”). Alternatively, the
plaintiff can satisfy this “heavy two-part burden” by the “clearly established weight of authority
from other courts [that have] found the law to be as [she] maintains.” Id. at 1135.
Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1179–80 (2d Cir. 1992).
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context,194 and by 2001, it was a perfunctory part of the application.195 In
2019, the Second Circuit imported this decision to disregard motive analysis
to another context.196 In discussing congressional inquiry, the court noted,
“[i]n this respect, the guiding principle is the same as that applicable when
an arrest is supported by probable cause and is ruled valid despite the arresting
officer’s motive to retaliate against a suspect for exercising a First
Amendment right.”197
The Fifth Circuit, as far back as 1984, acknowledged the probable cause
issue as an open question and signified that the motive of the arresting officer
may be the determinative factor.198 For example, motives may be relevant
when “the arrestee’s First Amendment rights are called into question where
the officer’s otherwise valid arrest is motivated by his desire to retaliate
against the arrestee for making a particular political speech.”199 In 1992, the
Fifth Circuit admitted that “the probable cause question is intertwined at
least in part with the First Amendment inquiry but also includes additional
factual issues. This query must go to the trier of fact.”200 A few short years
later, in 1995, the circuit court solved this issue by requiring a showing of
probable cause.201 In a retaliatory arrest case, the court said that an officer
could defeat a claim by showing, via a preponderance of evidence, that the
plaintiff “would have been arrested even if his political opinions or speech
activities had not been considered, i.e., because there existed probable

194

195

196
197
198
199

200
201

See Singer v. Fulton Cty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We have held previously that if
the officer either had probable cause or was qualifiedly immune from subsequent suit (due to an
objectively reasonable belief that he had probable cause), then we will not examine the officer’s
underlying motive in arresting and charging the plaintiff.”).
See Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (“As to the second element, because
defendants have probable cause to arrest plaintiff, an inquiry into the underlying motive for the
arrest need not be undertaken.”).
See Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627, 663 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that “the guiding
principle” of a congressional inquiry is the same as that in an arrest context).
Id.
See Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1453 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing the motivation of the
arresting officer).
Id. The court later said that the case did not implicate this issue. See id. at 1455–56 (holding that
the plaintiff “makes no complaint that [the arresting officer] did or threatened to do anything ‘more
than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion’”).
Enlow v. Tishomingo Cty., 962 F.2d 501, 510 (5th Cir. 1992). The plaintiff asserted a lack of
probable cause violating his First and Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
See Starling v. Fuller, 49 F.3d 1092, 1100 (5th Cir. 1995) (approving a jury instruction requiring the
jury to find probable cause at this stage of the analysis).
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cause.”202 More than a decade later, in 2002, the Fifth Circuit had a chance
to reify this decision.203 In 2016, the court explained:
a retaliation claim is only applicable “when non-retaliatory grounds are in
fact insufficient to provoke the adverse consequences.” As a result, even
where a citizen believes that he has been subject to a retaliatory detention or
arrest, if there was reasonable suspicion or probable cause for an officer to
seize the citizen, “the objectives of law enforcement take primacy over the citizen’s right
to avoid retaliation.”204

By 2020, the Fifth Circuit noted that according to the Supreme Court in
Nieves v. Bartlett, there can be no claim for an arrest that violates the First
Amendment without a claim that the arrest first violates the Fourth
Amendment.205
In 1989, the Eighth Circuit dealt with a case in which an arrest took place
and “a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed.”206
This fact provided qualified immunity for the police officer.207 In a dissent,
Judge Lay insisted that “the reason for [the] arrest was material to
determining whether a constitutional violation had occurred.”208 For that
reason, “it was for the jury to decide” whether the arrest occurred because of
the plaintiff’s speech or for the alleged crime.209 If probable cause is outcome
determinative, it does not always help the plaintiff to have a fact-finder
determine it.
More than a decade later, the Eighth Circuit was the only circuit court
to use the subjective/objective distinction to overlay its understanding of the
test: “the officers’ judgment was objectively reasonable. Therefore, the claim

202
203

204
205

206
207
208
209

Id.
Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Constable Tejeda is entitled to summary
judgment only if the ultimate finding of probable cause is not the subject of a genuine, material
factual dispute.”).
Allen v. Cisneros, 815 F.3d 239, 244–45 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (quoting Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006); Keenan, 290 F.3d at 261–62).
See Mayfield v. Currie, 976 F.3d 482, 486 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that the plaintiff’s claims
against the arresting officer fall under the Fourth Amendment). In fact in 2021 the Fifth Circuit
concluded that absence of probable cause is the first element necessary in a retaliatory arrest claim.
Kokesh v. Curlee, 14 F.4th 382, 396 (5th Cir. 2021) (“When asserting a claim for retaliatory arrest,
a plaintiff must first establish the absence of probable cause, and then demonstrate that the
retaliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the arrest.”).
Gorra v. Hanson, 880 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir. 1989).
See id. at 98 (holding that because the arresting officers’ interpretation of the relevant statute was no
unreasonable, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity).
Id. at 99 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 99–100 (emphasis added).
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of pretext is immaterial.”210 After all, “[pretext] would not nullify the finding
of probable cause,” and therefore no inquiry into pretext was necessary.211
After the Supreme Court decided Hartman v. Moore in 2006, the Eighth
Circuit found that “the Supreme Court’s holding in Hartman [was] broad
enough to apply even where intervening actions by a prosecutor are not
present” and lack of probable cause was a “necessary element” for a claim of
retaliation.212
Even when a lack of probable cause can be established, that fact alone
may not be enough for plaintiffs to recover. In 2010, the Eighth Circuit
decided a case in which plaintiffs claimed violations of First and Fourth
Amendment rights for a lack of probable cause.213 The lack of probable
cause clearly “violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights,” and thus
qualified immunity was inappropriate.214 Yet even without probable cause, there
was not enough evidence in the record to support a finding of retaliation, and
the court could not say “that a reasonable jury could find that retaliatory
animus was a substantial factor or ‘but-for’ cause of the plaintiffs’ arrest and
detention.”215
By 2014, the Eighth Circuit had added lack of probable cause to its list of
elements for a retaliatory arrest claim. 216 In retaliatory arrest cases, the
plaintiff must be (1) engaged in protected activity, (2) the government action
would chill an ordinary person, and (3) the protected activity motivated the
government action; and (4) “lack of probable cause or arguable probable
cause.”217 Interestingly, in the same case the court explained that “[t]he
causal connection is generally a jury question . . . [unless] the question is so

210
211
212

213
214
215
216
217

Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000).
Id.
Williams v. City of Carl Junction, 480 F.3d 871, 876–77 (8th Cir. 2007). This was a case about
citations and not an arrest. See id. at 873 (describing plaintiff’s acclaims that he was improperly
issued citations for municipal-ordinance violations). The court based this decision in part, on the
Sixth Circuit’s similar behavior in Barnes v. Wright. See id. at 876 (citing Barnes v. Wright, 449
F.3d 709 (6th Cir. 2006)) (agreeing with the Sixth Circuit that Hartman applies to cases where there
are no intervening actions by a prosecutor).
See Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that the plaintiffs
alleged violations of First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
Id. at 478.
Id. 481. The officers thus received qualified immunity. Id.
Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 602 (8th Cir. 2014) (adding another prong for evaluating
retaliatory arrest claims).
Id. (citing Galarnyk v. Fraser, 687 F.3d 1070, 1076 (8th Cir. 2012)).
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free from doubt as to justify taking it from the jury.”218 But by using probable
cause as a roadblock to causation, the jury never needs to hear any arguments
about pretext. In 2019, the court adopted Nieves and said broadly that “[a]n
arrest generally does not violate the Fourth Amendment or the First
Amendment when it is supported by probable cause.”219 The Eighth Circuit
had a chance to address the Nieves “narrow qualification” in 2021 but as the
arrested party did not offer sufficient evidence, it was inapplicable.220
The Eleventh Circuit has not given much analysis to the issue, noting in
a few, sparse cases that probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliation
claim without elaboration and confirming that the Supreme Court in Nieves
expanded Hartman.221
Even the circuit courts that began their jurisprudence with a desire not
to require plaintiffs to prove lack of probable cause to recover on a retaliatory
arrest claim eventually came in line with the high court over time.
The Ninth Circuit, in a seizure case in 2006, answered the then open
question of whether lack of probable cause was a required element for a
retaliatory arrest claim. 222 While lack of probable cause foreclosed the
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim, the court explained “a right exists to be free
of police action for which retaliation is a but-for cause even if probable cause
exists for that action.”223 The Supreme Court decided Hartman while the
appeal was pending in the case, but the lower court reasoned that the
retaliation claim “does not involve multi-layered causation as did the claim
in Hartman. . . . Thus, the rationale for requiring the pleading of no probable
cause in Hartman is absent here. This case presents an ‘ordinary’ retaliation
claim.”224 The court believed that Supreme Court precedent dictated that

218
219

220
221

222
223
224

Id. at 603 (quoting Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004)).
Johnson v. McCarver, 942 F.3d 405, 409 (8th Cir. 2019). Here, there was disagreement about
whether even “arguable probable cause” exists and whether the “First Amendment retaliation
claim remains viable.” Id. at 410, 413.
Just v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 7 F.4th 761, 768 n.4 (8th Cir. 2021).
See DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1294–98 (11th Cir. 2019) (analyzing Nieves);
Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1128, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that the officers had probable cause
to arrest the plaintiff); Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the officers had probable cause for arrest and thus are entitled to qualified immunity).
See Skoog v. Cty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Whether a plaintiff must
plead the absence of probable cause . . . is an open question in this circuit.”).
Id. at 1235. Yet because the issue was decided that day, it was not clearly established at the time of
Skoog’s arrest, and qualified immunity was still appropriate. Id.
Id. at 1234.
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“[t]he requirements of a cause of action should not be confused with the
doctrine designed to protect government officials: the doctrine of qualified
immunity.”225 In other words, even though protecting the government from
suit was a legitimate interest, it should not draw the lines of what was
necessary to state a claim and override the prima facie elements of the case.
Just two years later, in 2008, the Ninth Circuit faced an arrest case.226
The court noted that “the fact that Defendants had probable cause is not
dispositive. But it undoubtedly ha[s] high probative force.”227 Putting that
probative force to good use, the appellate court determined it should weigh
evidence of retaliatory motive and probable cause together—the First
Amendment claim should survive summary judgment when evidence of
retaliatory motive was high and evidence of probable cause was
threadbare.228 The First Amendment claim should not survive when there
was “very strong evidence of probable cause and very weak evidence of a
retaliatory motive.”229 If this was not the case, then “nearly every retaliatory
First Amendment claim would survive summary judgment.”230 This would
prevent the court from “protecting government officials from the disruption
caused by unfounded claims.”231 This weighing of evidence at the summary
judgment stage was properly reminiscent of the Mt. Healthy framework.
That said, because courts decide many of these claims on the issue of
qualified immunity, and because Reichle inevitably found its way into the
Ninth Circuit’s lexicon, the possibility of a First Amendment retaliatory
arrest claim became smaller and then almost non-existent.232 The Ninth
Circuit parroted the Supreme Court’s finding that “it had never recognized,
225
226
227
228
229
230
231

232

Id. at 1232 (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 589 (1998)).
See Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 894 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing the plaintiff’s
challenge of a traffic citation that was issued in alleged violation of her First Amendment right).
Id. at 901 (quoting Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265).
See id. (holding that Skoog does not apply because the present action “has very strong evidence of
probable cause and very weak evidence of a retaliatory motive”).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Skoog v. Cty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006)). The court
determined that “no reasonable juror could find from the undisputed facts that Defendants acted
in retaliation for Plaintiff’s First Amendment activities when [the o]fficer . . . gave her a traffic
citation.” Id.
See Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800, 826 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the arresting
officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable). Later this same year, the court decided Ford v. City
of Yakima, in which the majority and dissent disagreed over whether it was still possible to get
qualified immunity on this issue, consonant with Reichle. 706 F.3d 1188, 1193–1195.
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nor was there a clearly established First Amendment right to be free from a
retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by probable cause.”233 Until the
right was found or enunciated, any claims of qualified immunity on this
ground would likely succeed, insulating police officers for retaliatory arrests.
In a child custody case in 2019, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the
instructive nature of Nieves for causation purposes, writing:
if the plaintiff demonstrates that the arresting officer lacked probable cause,
that showing bridges the causal gap by “reinforc[ing] the retaliation evidence
and show[ing] that retaliation was the but-for basis” of the official’s action.
. . . A plaintiff who shows differential treatment addresses the causal concern
by helping to establish that non-retaliatory grounds were in fact insufficient
to provoke the adverse consequences.234

Unfortunately, these were the only two paths the Supreme Court had left
open to prove causation in this context.
By 1998, the Tenth Circuit had also recognized that subjective motive
evidence was relevant to a retaliation claim even when using a qualified
immunity analysis.235 Nearly two decades later, the court struggled to apply
this concept because it found “where a question of ultimate fact . . . cannot
be resolved as a matter of law, the law is not clearly established and qualified
immunity is appropriate.”236 Thus, the intersection of qualified immunity
and the necessary subjective component of a retaliatory arrest claim was
problematic. The court in 2011 understood the Hartman precedent as
requiring a heightened pleading standard because of “complex causation,
evidentiary concerns, and the presumption of prosecutorial regularity.”237
As the Supreme Court had taken pains to distinguish complex from ordinary
retaliation claims,238 the court of appeals insisted there must be a difference,
because “[e]ven if an official’s action would be ‘unexceptionable if taken on

233
234

235

236
237

238

Id. at 825 (citing Reichle, 566 U.S. at 670).
Capp v. Cty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1723,
1727). In 2021, the Ninth Circuit found that Nieves did not apply to an immigration bond context
as it was not a criminal arrest. Bello-Reyes v. Gaynor, 985 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 2021).
Coen v. Runner, 854 F.2d 374, 378 (10th Cir. 1988) (“[W]hen intent or motive is an element of
the plaintiff’s constitutional claim against governmental officials, the wholly objective approach
suggested by Harlow is inappropriate.”).
Nielander v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Republic, 582 F.3d 1155, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009).
Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131, 1148 (10th Cir. 2011). This was the case that the Supreme
Court overturned in Reichle. The dissent argued that there was a strong argument that Hartman
applies to arrests because of the similar presence of immunity and the fact that evidence on probable
cause would always be available and relevant. Id. at 1151–52 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
See id. (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Hartman).
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other grounds,’ when retaliation against Constitutionally-protected speech is
the but-for cause of that action, this retaliation is actionable and ‘subject to
recovery.’”239 The Supreme Court found no such recognized right and thus
would mandate qualified immunity in that very case.240 By 2020 the Tenth
Circuit had adopted the precedent of the Supreme Court and now found
that “[t]he presence of probable cause is . . . a bar to a First Amendment
retaliation claim.”241
Several circuits, including the First, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and D.C.
Circuits, did not have the chance in reported, relevant cases to definitively
resolve the issue of whether lack of probable cause was a required element of
a retaliatory arrest claim.
The First Circuit reported no relevant cases on the intersection of
probable cause and First Amendment retaliation. In a District of
Massachusetts case, the court cited Holland v. City of Portland for First Circuit
support that “[a]ctual motive sometimes does play a role in section 1983
actions. There may be probable cause to arrest, but arrest in fact was
triggered only by a desire to chill First Amendment rights.”242 In that case,
the First Circuit had explained the Supreme Court’s holding in Whren v.
United States, discussing the decision to arrest.243 The Supreme Court was
clear that subjective intentions played no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis and “[t]he decision to arrest, where probable
cause exists, is a discretionary one informed by many considerations. And
any attempt to untangle the ascribed motive from a skein of others . . . would
invite exactly the inquiry into police motivation condemned by Whren.”244
But that did not mean that “probable cause forecloses every possible
challenge to an arrest.”245 Regrettably, the Supreme Court “does not say
what facts would be needed to support such a challenge.”246

239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

Id. at 1143.
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 670 (2012) (holding that Hartman’s ambiguity on retaliatory
arrests meant that the plaintiff’s arrest was supported by probable cause).
Fenn v. City of Truth or Consequences, 983 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2020).
Britton v. Maloney, 981 F. Supp. 25, 52 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing Holland v. City of Portland, 102
F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1996)).
Holland v. City of Portland, 102 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1996).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
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In 2012, the district court called the issue an “open question,”247 but by
2019, it cited Nieves for the proposition that “‘[t]he plaintiff pressing a
retaliatory arrest claim must [also] plead and prove the absence of probable
cause for the arrest.’ ‘Absent such a showing, a retaliatory arrest claim fails.’
But ‘[i]f the plaintiff proves the absence of probable cause, then the Mt.
Healthy . . . test governs.’”248
The Third Circuit noted in 2013 in an unpublished case that it had “not
decided whether the logic of Hartman applies to retaliatory arrest claims.”249
However, it need not decide the issue for purpose of qualified immunity as
“Reichle . . . conclusively disposes of this inquiry . . . [holding] it was not
clearly established that an arrest supported by probable cause could give rise
to a First Amendment violation.”250 The Fourth Circuit also saw this issue
through the lens of qualified immunity and found “the Reichle principle is fully
controlling.” 251 The qualified immunity issue almost transforms into a
content issue with the court articulating without explanation right after the
discussion of qualified immunity that “[plaintiff’s violation] gave [the officer]
probable cause to arrest [plaintiff]; therefore his arrest was not retaliatory.”252
The D.C. Circuit heard the case that led to Hartman.253 The court continued
to litigate over its meaning and the later cases, and almost a decade later in
2013, still found that “retaliatory arrest and retaliatory prosecution are
distinct constitutional violations.”254
The Seventh Circuit declined to address whether “probable cause is a
complete defense . . . in the context of an arrest” in a 2002 case in which the
plaintiff had established no evidence of retaliatory motive.255 This left the
question open. Still, the court noted that “even if a defendant was brimming
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254

255

Turkowitz v. Town of Provincetown, 914 F. Supp. 2d 62, 73 (D. Mass. 2012).
Cass v. Town of Wayland, 383 F. Supp. 3d 66, 85–86 (D. Mass. 2019).
Primrose v. Mellot, 541 F. Appx. 177, 180 n.2 (3d Cir. 2017).
Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 522 (3d Cir. 2018).
Pegg v. Hernberger, 845 F.3d 112, 119 (4th Cir. 2017).
Id. In the only other relevant, reported, circuit case the plaintiff pled lack of probable cause so the
issue was irrelevant. See Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2013).
Moore v. Hartman, 388 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Moore v. Hartman, 704 F.3d 1003, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Judge Kavanaugh dissented, as he
argued that precisely because the law was not clear, the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity on the issue. See id.
Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 657 (7th Cir. 2002). The court abrogated this case in Spiegla v.
Hull when the court found that burden shifting required the plaintiff to allege retaliation as a
motivating factor and then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the same action would
have occurred in the absence of the protected conduct. 371 F.3d 928, 942 (7th Cir. 2004).
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over with unconstitutional wrath against a § 1983 plaintiff, that plaintiff
cannot prevail unless he or she establishes that the challenged action would
not have occurred ‘but for’ the constitutionally protected conduct.”256 In
2012, the court held that “probable cause, if not a complete bar to [plaintiff’s]
retaliatory arrest claim, provides strong evidence that he would have been
arrested regardless of any illegitimate animus.”257 As in other circuits, the
Seventh Circuit saw the unsettled case law over whether probable cause was
a complete bar to these claims, but because the Supreme Court reified the
lack of clarity in Reichle, qualified immunity was appropriate.258 By 2019, the
door was closed and arrest “cannot be challenged if supported by probable
cause.” 259 In 2020, the court stated, “probable cause defeats a claim of
retaliatory arrest. No further analysis of causation, motive, or injury is
required. Nieves has left nothing further to discuss.”260
The Sixth Circuit has perhaps had the most contentious relationship with
lack-of-probable-cause as an element to a First Amendment retaliatory arrest
claim. In 2001, the Sixth Circuit corrected a lower district court which had
admitted that “[i]t was not clearly established that the First Amendment
prohibited an officer from effectuating an otherwise valid arrest if that officer
was motivated by a desire to retaliate against the arrestee’s assertion of First
Amendment rights.”261 The circuit court found it was clearly established that
retaliation against the exercise of First Amendment rights was inappropriate
and because there was a lack of probable cause, claims under the First and
Fourth Amendment could proceed.262 In that case, the dissent argued that
applying the Mt. Healthy retaliation framework would be inappropriate
“because Mt. Healthy did not involve a police officer’s decision to arrest, an
obligation at the core of the officer’s responsibilities and necessarily made on
the spot without the luxury of investigation.”263 This was the only judge to
suggest that the peculiarities of arrest should allow a court to disregard the
traditional burden-shifting framework.
256
257
258
259
260
261

262
263

Abrams, 307 F.3d at 654 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thayer v. Chiczerski, 705 F.3d 237, 252 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Frederickson v. Landeros, 943 F.3d 1054, 1058 (2019).
Lund v. City of Rockford, 956 F.3d 938, 944 (7th Cir. 2020).
McCurdy v. Montgomery Cty., 240 F.3d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 2001). In this particular case, because
“no rational jury” could find probable cause, there was the potential for a retaliation claim. Id. at
522.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 526 (Engel, J., dissenting).
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Just one year later in 2002, the Sixth Circuit found that “[t]he existence
of probable cause is not determinative of the constitutional question if, as alleged
here, the plaintiff was arrested in retaliation for his having engaged in
constitutionally protected speech.”264 For purposes of qualified immunity,
the court went as far as to reiterate that “[t]he law is well-established that an
action taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right
is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason,
would have been proper.”265
Yet after the Supreme Court decided Hartman v. Moore, the ground shifted
for the Sixth Circuit. Even though at that point its “precedents d[id] not
require [a plaintiff] to prove lack of probable cause in order to go forward
with his First Amendment retaliation claim,”266 the circuit precedents could
not stand alone. In the wake of Hartman’s ruling on retaliatory prosecutions,
and “regardless of the reasoning, it [was] clear that the Hartman rule modifies
[the] holdings and applies in this case.” 267 Applying Hartman, the First
Amendment claim failed as a matter of law.268 By the time the Supreme
Court decided Nieves, the Sixth Circuit claimed it was clear “if there is a
showing of probable cause, a retaliatory arrest claim fails.”269
Even with Nieves firmly in place as a roadblock to retaliatory arrest claims,
the Sixth Circuit still encountered a case that “may not be subject to the
general rule of Nieves.”270 In Novak v. City of Parma, the plaintiff created a
parody Facebook page to mock the local police department.271 The police
department arrested Novak for unlawfully impairing the function of the
department.272 Novak went to trial and was ultimately acquitted before filing
multiple claims against the police department, including a First Amendment
retaliatory arrest claim.273 The defendants moved to dismiss these claims and

264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273

Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
Id.
Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 718–19 (6th Cir. 2007). The court took care to note that the
precedents relied on Mt. Healthy. See id. at 718.
Id. at 720.
Id.
Hartman v. Thompson, 931 U.S. 471, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2019).
Novak v. City of Parma, 932 F.3d 421, 431 (6th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 424.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 426
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also claimed qualified immunity for their actions. 274 The Sixth Circuit
conceded:
[i]f the police did not have probable cause to arrest Novak, then he may bring
a claim of retaliation. To prevail on this claim, Novak will need to show that
the officers arrested him based on a forbidden retaliatory motive. But
retaliatory motive is often difficult to prove . . . A plaintiff alleging retaliatory
motive must disentangle . . . wholly legitimate considerations of speech from
any wholly illegitimate retaliatory motives.275

The court also acknowledged that the Supreme Court in 2012 had
disavowed recognizing a First Amendment right to be free from retaliatory
arrest that was supported by probable cause and “it remains true today.”276
That said, the presented factual situation was unique because the sole basis
for probable cause was the protected speech that Novak made. 277 The
causation issue was, thus, not as “thorny” because there was no “mix of
protected speech and unprotected conduct.”278 The court also found that
“this case strikes at the heart of a problem the [Supreme] Court has
recognized in recent retaliation cases. There is a risk that some police officers
may exploit the arrest power as a means of suppressing speech.”279 In a case
in which speech itself causes the arrest, it “at least raises a concern that
probable cause does little to prove or disprove the connection between
Novak’s criticism of the police and his arrest.”280 This is a clear indication
that Nieves did not completely solve the relationship between probable cause
and retaliatory arrest claims.
It would be expected for circuit courts of appeals to analogize Hartman
more deeply and to explore how arrests differ from or are similar to
prosecutions. It would help unpack retaliation claims and distinguish
complex from ordinary causation and explain how these items, with the
distracting wrinkle of qualified immunity, created a cause of action for
retaliatory arrest. Yet most circuit courts that precluded relief collapsed the
inquiry into arrests more generally—concluding that a Fourth and First
Amendment claim are legally identical. Even the courts that pushed for
274
275
276
277
278
279
280

Id.
Id. at 429.
Id. This means that Novak’s right was not clearly established (and neither was the minute Nieves
exception) so the officers would ultimately receive qualified immunity. See id. at 430–31.
Id. at 431.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 432.
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protection under the First Amendment were unable to stem the tide of
qualified immunity that shielded officers who may have engaged in arrests
based on pretext.
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND SHIFTING PLEADING
STANDARDS:
While the Supreme Court was crafting its jurisprudence in the area of
retaliatory arrest claims, 281 and the circuits were slogging through
application,282 another track of jurisprudence was concurrently developing
and changing. In 2007, just one year after its decision in Hartman v. Moore,
the Supreme Court changed the essence of pleading under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8.283 This shift from factual allegations that were possible to
those that were plausible, with a standard that excised conclusory allegations
changed the face of complaints and motions to dismiss.284
To see the depth of the change in this area, it is necessary to go back to
Conley v. Gibson, where the Supreme Court had reified the standard of notice
pleading.285 In that case, employees alleged through a class action violations
of the Railway Labor Act.286 The complaint alleged several facts: (1) the
plaintiffs’ status as employees, (2) the status of the union as the designated
bargaining agent under the act, (3) the existence of a contract between the
union and the railroad, (4) a breach of that contract when the railroad
“abolished” jobs but really only engaged in racially discriminatory hiring and
retention practices, and (5) the union’s failure to protect the employees from
those actions.287 Part of the procedural response of the defendants was a

281
282
283

284

285
286
287

See supra Section I.
See supra Section II.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (holding that allegations of parallel conduct
must be paired with enough factual context to raise a plausible suggestion of an agreement in
order to state a valid claim under the Sherman Act § 1).
See generally Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010) (proposing a
new theory to reconcile Twombly with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and prior Court
precedents); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA
L. REV. 821 (2010) (discussing the Court’s shift in Twombly from a minimal notice pleading regime
to one of strict gatekeeping); Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 473 (2010) (discussing Twombly’s connections to prior cases and proposing ways to limit its
impact).
See 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
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motion to dismiss that claimed the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.288
The Court recounted that “the accepted rule [is] that a complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.”289 To the complaint at hand, if its allegations were
proven true, the Court would find a “manifest breach of the Union’s
statutory duty to represent fairly and without hostile discrimination all of the
employees in the bargaining unit.”290
The Union argued the problem with the language of the complaint was
that it “failed to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations of
discrimination” and that this made the dismissal ultimately proper.291 That
said, the Court found “[t]he decisive answer to this [was] that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim.”292 The point of the rule was to “give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.”293 This kind of pleading, termed “notice pleading” by the
Court could exist because of all of the other procedural backstops in the
federal rules that allowed for later precision on “the basis of both claim and
defense” and more narrow definition of “the disputed facts and issues.”294 In
their entirety, the Court recognized that the “[t]he Federal Rules reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel

288

289
290
291
292
293
294

Id. Another part of the procedural response was about whether the National Railroad Adjustment
Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy. See id. The District Court dismissed the
complaint, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on this jurisdictional ground. See id. at 43–
44. The Supreme Court found it was an error to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the layout
of the lawsuit, between the employees and the union and not the employees and the employer. See
id. at 44. Once jurisdiction was established, the Court advanced to other considerations over
whether the dismissal was appropriate. See id. at 45.
Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added).
Id. at 46. This “no set of facts” language would become critical to the standard’s ultimate
dismantling.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 47–48. The Court referred to in a footnote these several other procedural devices including
“Rule 12(e) (motion for a more definite statement); Rule 12(f) (motion to strike portions of the
pleading); Rule 12(c) (motion for judgment on the pleadings); Rule 16 (pre-trial procedure and
formulation of issue); Rules 26–37 (depositions and discovery); Rule 56 (motion for summary
judgment): Rule 15 (right to amend).” See id. at 48 n.9.
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may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”295
Notice pleading held for fifty years until the tides turned for pleading
standards and the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly in
2007.296 The plaintiffs filed suit for a determination of whether certain major
telecommunications providers violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.297 To be
found liable under the relevant statute, the telecommunications providers
had to have a contract or conspiracy to restrain trade or commerce.298 Mr.
Twombly represented a class of subscribers to the telecommunications
services that alleged such a conspiracy through parallel conduct in each
provider’s respective service area to inhibit competition. 299 The second
portion of the complaint alleged an agreement between the providers to
refrain from competing against one another that could be inferred from a
failure to engage in meaningful opportunities in contiguous markets.300 With
the data available to the subscribers, and no evidence of an actual agreement
to refrain from competition, the petitioners sued.
In an opinion penned by Justice Souter, the Court narrowed the issue to
one of pleading and framed it as “whether a . . . complaint can survive a
motion to dismiss when it alleges that . . . providers engaged in certain
parallel conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context
suggesting agreement as distinct from identical, independent action.”301 The
Court granted certiorari “to address the proper standard for pleading an
antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct.”302
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) governed the standard for
pleading in the civil complaint. The Court again conceded that a plaintiff
“does not need detailed factual allegations,” but also implored that there
must be “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action [would] not do.”303 The standard the Court
now read into Rule 8 was for “[f]actual allegations . . . enough to raise a right

295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303

Id. at 48.
See 550 US. 544 (2007).
See id. at 548.
See id.
See id. at 550.
See id. at 551.
Id. at 548–49.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 555.
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to relief above the speculative level.”304 As applied here, the Court noted
that “[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement.”305 That hinge on the concept of plausibility, as more and distinct
from Conley’s notion of possibility, turned the dial up on what was required
from a plaintiff’s pleading. Parallel conduct of the telecommunications
companies was “admissible circumstantial evidence,”306 but it “[fell] short of
conclusively establishing” a violation of the law. 307 It led to two equal
conclusions: innocent behavior or nefarious conspiracy. The complaint
needed more factual allegations to “nudge” that line of equality closer to
conspiracy to survive the motion to dismiss.308
This request for allegations plausibly suggesting a violation of the law
dovetailed with the nature of the threshold inquiry of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8, “that the plain statement possess enough heft to show that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” 309 Moreover, creating a greater burden (or
interpreting one in) at the pleading stage was helpful because “antitrust
discovery can be expensive.”310 While the plaintiffs argued that this holding
contradicted the notice pleading of Conley v. Gibson, the Court balked at the
lower court’s reading of Conley that “would dispense with any showing of a
reasonably founded hope that a plaintiff would be able to make a case.”311
Because of this perceived repeated misunderstanding, the Court noted that
the “no set of facts” language “ha[d] earned its retirement. The phrase is
best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading

304
305
306
307
308

309
310

311

Id. (citing 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1216, pp. 235–36 (3d ed. 2004)).
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id. at 557. The Court framed it thus: “[a]n allegation of parallel conduct is thus much like a naked
assertion of conspiracy in a . . . complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but without
some further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558. The Court felt it was probable that “only by taking care to require allegations that reach
the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of
discovery in cases with no reasonably founded hope that the discovery process will reveal relevant
evidence.” Id. at 559.
Id. at 562.
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standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”312
The lower court’s real error was in finding “the prospect of unearthing
direct evidence of conspiracy sufficient to preclude dismissal, even though
the complaint [did] not set forth a single fact in a context that suggest[ed] an
agreement.” 313 Pleading based on “optimism” and “reasonably founded
hope that a plaintiff would be able to make a case” was insufficient.314 In the
context of an antitrust conspiracy, the Court found resisting competition to
be routine market conduct and that “if alleging parallel decisions to resist
competition were enough to imply an antitrust conspiracy, pleading a . . .
violation against almost any group of competing businesses would be a sure
thing.”315
Justice Stevens dissented in Twombly, partially joined by Justice
Ginsburg.316 He wrote that if the real issue was whether parallel conduct was
enough to violate the Sherman Act, “the answer to that question has been
settled for more than 50 years.”317 A previous case had held that “parallel
conduct is circumstantial evidence admissible on the issue of conspiracy, but
it is not itself illegal.”318 The plaintiffs alleged this conduct “has long been
recognized as a classic per se violation of the Sherman Act” and the Court
would require no discovery or even an answer before dismissing the
complaint.319 The very equality of outcomes that the majority posited – that
the allegation evidence equally supported unlawful conspiracy and innocent
conduct—meant that a possibility of illegal agreement existed. Because these
allegations describe unlawful conduct, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
[the Court’s] longstanding precedent, and sound practice mandate that the
District Court at least require some sort of response from petitioners before

312
313
314
315
316

317
318
319

Id. at 563. “Conley, then, described the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint
claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.” Id.
Id. at 561–62 (emphasis added).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 566.
See id. at 570 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg did not sign on to Part IV of his opinion,
where Justice Stevens discussed Congressional intent in the matter. See id. at 595–97 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 570–71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 571 (citing Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540–42
(1954)).
Id. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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dismissing the case.” 320 Justice Stevens pointed out the two practical
concerns he felt motivated the majority’s decision: the expensive nature of
antitrust litigation and the risk of juror confusion over this type of conduct.321
He concluded that these concerns,
merit careful case management, including strict control of discovery, careful
scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage, and lucid instructions
to juries; they do not, however, justify the dismissal of an adequately
pleaded complaint without even requiring the defendants to file answers
denying a charge that they in fact engaged in collective decisionmaking.
More importantly, they do not justify an interpretation of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) that seems to be driven by the majority’s appraisal
of the plausibility of the ultimate factual allegation rather than its legal
sufficiency.322

Justice Stevens drew a compelling distinction between plausibility and
possibility that would allow allegations, assumed to be true, to survive the
complaint stage and engage in some level of answer and discovery before
potentially being resolved either through summary judgment or trial.
Federal Rule 8 was, in fact, drafted and approved with an intentionality to
avoid reference to “facts, or evidence, or conclusions.”323 The idea was to
keep litigants in court as opposed to out, and to sort out the merits of a claim
“during a flexible pretrial process and, as appropriate, through the crucible
of trial.”324 It was in this history that the Court should understand Conley, he
argued.325 Conley’s “no set of facts” language “permits outright dismissal only
when proceeding to discovery or beyond would be futile.”326 Yet even with
all this protest, Justice Stevens admitted that “[e]verything today’s majority
says would . . . make perfect sense if it were ruling on a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment and the evidence included nothing more than the Court

320
321

322
323
324
325
326

Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). He later explained, “if I had been the trial judge in this case, I would
not have permitted the plaintiffs to engage in massive discovery based solely on the allegations in
this complaint. On the other hand, I surely would not have dismissed the complaint without
requiring the defendants to answer the charge.” Id. at 593 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 576 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens later said that if Conley’s no set of facts language
was “to be interred, let it not be without a eulogy.” Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). He noted that the
Court had never questioned the language and it was supported by several lower courts and state
courts and even the petitioners in the case. See id. at 578–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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has described.” 327 It was the stage of the proceeding that was critical –
complaints were for allegations and summary judgment and beyond for
evidence. But the ruling was not on summary judgment but on a motion to
dismiss, and Justice Stevens wrote that the majority’s “plausibility standard
is irreconcilable with Rule 8 and with our governing precedents.”328
After the Twombly Court shifted pleading standards toward plausibility,
the question remained whether this new formulation would apply to all
complaints or just complex ones involving antitrust.329 Two years later in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court clarified that the decision in Twombly was, in reality,
an interpretation of Federal Rule 8 and thus “expounded the pleading
standard for all civil actions, and it applies to antitrust and discrimination
suits alike.”330
In that case, police arrested Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim from Pakistan, after
September 11, 2001 on criminal charges and federal officials detained
him. 331 Part of his complaint against the federal government included
allegations that they had targeted him “on account of his race, religion, or
national origin, in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution.”332 The pleading named Attorney General John Ashcroft and
FBI Director Robert Mueller specifically as crafting and executing a policy
of discrimination respectively. 333 The defendants “moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state sufficient allegations to show their own
involvement in clearly established unconstitutional conduct.”334 The District
Court used Conley to decide the matter and denied the motion, but while the
appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Twombly, “which discussed
327
328

329

330
331
332
333
334

Id. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Another problem here was ignoring the will of Congress. Justice Stevens
explained that “[t]his is a case in which the intentions of three important sources of law— the
Sherman Act, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the Federal Rules of Procedure—all point
unmistakably in the same direction, yet the Court marches resolutely the other way.” Id. at 596
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
See John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal: The Latest Retreat From Notice Pleading, 43 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2009) (discussing the impact of the Twombly decision and the lack of clarity on how to
apply it); Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts After
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 858–59 (2008) (explaining how
district courts and commentators believed Twombly could be interpreted in multiple ways).
556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
Id. at 666.
Id. at 668–69.
See id. at 669.
Id.
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the standard for evaluating whether a complaint is sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss.”335
After concluding that it had appropriate jurisdiction over the case,336 the
Court, as it had done in Twombly, began “by taking note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against
officials entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity.”337 One element
incumbent on the plaintiff to plead and prove was that the defendant acted
with discriminatory purpose. 338 To act with discriminatory purpose a
defendant must take an action because it will create adverse effects on an
identifiable group.339
To see if this element was sufficiently pleaded, the Court turned to the
complaint. 340 The Court clarified, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”341 While “the pleading standard
Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations . . . it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”342 This interpretation of the Rule led the Court to develop a
two-step analysis based on Twombly and derived from its principles: (1) a court
must accept factual allegations in the complaint as true but not legal
conclusions and (2) only a complaint that then stated a plausible claim for
relief would survive a motion to dismiss.343
In the complaint at hand, the Court determined that the pertinent
allegations were “bare assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy in
Twombly, [which] amount[ed] to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of
335
336

337
338
339
340
341

342
343

Id.
Id. at 675 (“The District Court’s order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss is a final decision
under the collateral-order doctrine over which the Court of Appeals had, and this Court has,
jurisdiction. We proceed to consider the merits of petitioners’ appeal.”).
Id. (emphasis added). This language tends toward elements pleading.
See id. at 676.
See id. at 676–77. Respondent was arguing instead for a theory of vicarious liability, which the
Court declined to use. Id.
See id.
Id. at 678. The Court also explained that two principles girded the decision from Twombly: (1) that
a court must accept factual allegations in the complaint as true but not legal conclusions and (2)
only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief would survive a motion to dismiss. See id. at
678–79.
Id.
See id. at 678–79. This process echoes the well-pleaded complaint rule from Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
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the elements of a constitutional discrimination claim.”344 The Court did not
reject these allegations “on the ground that they are unrealistic or nonsensical
. . . [i]t is the conclusory nature of the respondent’s allegations, rather than
their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption
of truth.”345 Under the first step of Twombly, the Court need not consider
these allegations because they were conclusory.
The second step of Twombly required a reading of whether the real,
factual allegations of the respondent’s complaint plausibly suggested an
entitlement to relief.346 While the factual allegations of arrest and detention
of thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of the investigation of the events
of September 11th and the highly restrictive detention of those men were
“consistent with” the claims of discrimination, they were not sufficient.347
The Court found that “given more likely explanations, [the allegations] do
not plausibly establish [discriminatory] purpose.” 348 The Court reasoned
that as nineteen Arab Muslim hijackers perpetrated the September 11th
attacks, it was likely that a legitimate policy to investigate those attacks
“would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even
though the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”349
Moreover, even if the complaint’s allegations were sufficient for plausible
discrimination on Iqbal’s arrest, that was not his claim.350 His claim was that
there was a policy in place of discrimination, and his complaint failed to
establish that claim.351 In sum, because the “complaint does not contain any
factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory
state of mind . . . [h]is pleadings . . . do not meet the standard necessary to
comply with Rule 8.”352 Even the promise of minimal discovery from the
lower court could not help Iqbal’s case, as the Court found that “[b]ecause
respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery,
cabined or otherwise.”353

344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353

Id. at 681.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 682.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
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This time, not only did Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg dissent as
they had in Twombly, but Justice Breyer and Justice Souter joined them.354
Justice Souter wrote the dissent here but had written the majority opinion in
Twombly. He asserted that the majority “misapplie[d] the pleading standard
under . . . Twombly”355 Tracing to the allegations of the complaint, Justice
Souter pointed out that it “alleges, at a bare minimum that Ashcroft and
Mueller knew of and condoned the discriminatory policy their subordinates
carried out.”356 The defendants argued that this was not enough to satisfy
the plausibility standard of Twombly, but Justice Souter noted that “Twombly
does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether
the factual allegations are probably true. We made it clear, on the contrary,
that a court must take the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the
court may be.”357 Unlike the facts of Twombly, Justice Souter argued that
“the allegations in the complaint are neither confined to naked legal
conclusions nor consistent with legal conduct.” 358 The complaint alleged
discrimination on account of race, religion, and national origin and also
alleged the knowledge and indifference that even Ashcroft and Mueller
conceded were sufficient for liability: enough for plausibility.359 While both
the dissent and the majority agreed that Twombly should be applied in all
pleading cases, the disagreement came from how to determine which
allegations the court should find “conclusory” and excise from the complaint
as extraneous to a plausibility calculation.360

354

355

356
357

358
359
360

See id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also wrote a separate dissent focused on the
argument that other protections existed besides this use of Twombly to protect the government from
unwarranted litigation. Id. at 699–700.
Id. at 688. He also argued that the majority does away with supervisory liability under Bivens. See
id. at 687–88 (Souter, J., dissenting). This is intertwined with the pleading issue because it changes
what the respondent ought to have pleaded.
Id. at 695 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 695–96 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter concedes that “[t]he sole exception to this rule
lies with allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little
green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel. This is not what we
have here.” Id.
Id. at 696–97 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 697 (Souter, J., dissenting). This is evidence of a disagreement with the majority about the
required elements as well.
Id. at 699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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IV. HARMONIZING PLEADING REQUIREMENTS WITH PROPER
ELEMENTS FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATORY ARREST CLAIM
Plaintiffs seeking to recover for a retaliatory arrest must plead facts that
support each element of a retaliatory arrest claim, including causation.361
The Supreme Court identified the core elements of a First Amendment
retaliation claim in Mt. Healthy, and as adapted by circuit courts in the context
of arrest, those elements have been fairly static. A First Amendment
retaliation claim may occur when a plaintiff engages in protected speech and
when retaliatory animus because of that speech creates an injury. In the arrest
context, this means a plaintiff must plead and prove (1) she engaged in
protected speech, and (2) the officer arrested her because of that speech.362
The proper causation standard is “but-for” causation.363 That is, but for the
retaliatory animus, the arrest would not have taken place.
The causation element has always been the most crucial and the most
tenuous. It can be extremely difficult to prove why someone was arrested.
And while a lack of probable cause can at least partially serve as a proxy for
causation, because without probable cause it is far more likely that an officer
based the arrest on some illegitimate motive like retaliation, it is not the only
way to prove causation. There is the Nieves exception, of course, that a
plaintiff might prove with empirical data that others were in a similar
situation but were not similarly arrested.364 But more possibilities exist. For
example, several circuits mention the suspicious nature of “temporal

361

362

363

364

It is true that notice pleading is usually not synonymous with elements pleading, but the allegations
have to line up to make the overall cause of action plausible which usually sorts into elements. See,
e.g., Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error, 20
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2010) (describing the requirements of Twombly and Iqbal).
See e.g., McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 696 (5th Cir. 2017) (explaining that while most recitations of
this test include another element, that the officer’s action must cause the plaintiff “to suffer an injury
that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity,” that
element is usually satisfied by an arrest). Some courts, like the Eighth Circuit, add a fourth element
of lack of probable cause or arguable probable cause. See Thurairajah v. City of Ft. Smith, 925
F.3d 979, 984–85 (8th Cir. 2019).
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989) (“A court that finds for a plaintiff under
this standard [from Mt. Healthy] has effectively concluded that an illegitimate motive was a ‘but-for’
cause of the employment decision.”).
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019).
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proximity” between the protected speech and the ultimate arrest.365 Many
things could fall into this second bucket of facts sufficient to overcome
probable cause and prove retaliatory animus motivated the arrest.366 But at
least where evidence of competing motivations exists, it should be a factfinder’s job to resolve the issue.
The Court’s burden-shifting framework originally envisioned in Mt.
Healthy was crafted to invite competing evidence of causation, where it
existed, to determine the truth of causation.367 In that framework, a plaintiff
would plead that retaliation was a substantial or motivating factor of the
arrest and then the burden would shift to the defendant to show that the same
action would occur without the retaliatory animus. This framework treated
proving lack of but-for causation as an affirmative defense rather than an
element of the claim.
When Mt. Healthy was decided, courts were still beholden to the pleading
standards from Conley, when a plaintiff could plead any set of facts which
made her claim conceivable. This would allow a plaintiff to allege an arrest
and use these allegations to flip the burden to the defense to prove that the
arrest was proper and not motivated by retaliation for protected speech. But
the pleading landscape has evolved, and the Supreme Court has clarified its
pleading jurisprudence. Now courts require plaintiffs to plead facts that
make their claims “plausible.” The facts of Twombly itself highlight this shift.
In Twombly, the plaintiff alleged two equally likely possibilities: the defendant
was responding with a legal motive or an illegal one. The Supreme Court
said that equality was not enough to survive a motion to dismiss, and the
plaintiff must nudge her claim from merely possible, to plausible.368
365

366

367
368

See, e.g., Hoyland v. McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644, 657 (8th Cir. 2017) (“Temporal proximity is
relevant, even if not dispositive in situations like this.”); Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 652 (3d
Cir. 2017) (“One method of proving a causal link, applicable here, is unusually suggestive temporal
proximity . . . [which] would normally be enough to carry a complaint across the starting line in
the face of a Rule 12(b) (6) motion.”); Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
temporal proximity of his peaceful protest and his arrest . . . shows Appellants engaged in
impermissible retaliation.”).
See John Koerner, Between Healthy and Hartman: Probable Cause in Retaliatory Arrest Cases, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 755, 794 (2009) (identifying five forms of alternative evidence available in the arrest context
that are unavailable in the prosecution context to overcome probable cause: verbal threats, verbal
statements of intent, motive to retaliate, disproportionate impact, and temporal proximity).
See 429 U.S. 274, 286–87 (1977).
Even in this context, the Ninth Circuit has remembered “the Supreme Court’s admonition that an
allegation is not plausible where there is an obvious alternative explanation for alleged misconduct.”
Capp v. Cty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir. 2019).
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Thus, the burden-shifting framework may have made sense under a
conceivability standard, because if the plaintiff merely alleged retaliation as
one motive, it was conceivable the arrest was retaliatory. Yet for the
retaliation to be plausible as the ‘but-for’ cause of the arrest, the plaintiff must
now plead more. Causation can no longer be treated as an affirmative
defense.
Critically, this shift in pleading standards took place after the Supreme
Court decided Hartman v. Moore, which dominated the later conversation
about retaliatory arrests. During this time, the modern doctrine on qualified
immunity also evolved.369 Because courts now identify qualified immunity
as immunity from suit itself and not merely damages, 370 more and more
decisions are happening at the summary judgment stage.371 The Supreme
Court’s adopting of lack of probable cause as an element overburdens the
plaintiff while simultaneously not recognizing the built-in burden the plaintiff
already suffers under the new pleading regime. Thus, it is unnecessary. A
plaintiff should have to plead, under Twombly and conforming to the Mt.
Healthy framework, factual allegations which make it plausible that her arrest
was because of retaliation. She could do this by accessing two tracks: she
could prove lack of probable cause or some other allegation of pretext despite
probable cause that still made it plausible that she was arrested for the
purpose of retaliation. In essence, the original elements from Mt. Healthy are
preserved, but made to serve plausible pleading standards. Of course, for
this approach to succeed given qualified immunity, the Supreme Court will
have to acknowledge the sound principle that there is a right to be free from
a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause if the animus is still
the ‘but-for’ cause of the arrest.
What makes this a preferable solution to the one the Supreme Court
settled on in Nieves? First, by holding the plaintiff to a plausibility pleading
standard, labor is properly divided among the parties and a court may
reinforce the concept of burden-shifting. This allows the plaintiff to
overcome a motion to dismiss and engage in at least some level of discovery
before summary judgment, hopefully explaining the true nature of the arrest.

369
370
371

See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 231 (2006) (noting the
impact of Harlow v. Fitzgerald and the Supreme Court adopting an objective test).
See Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012).
As denials of summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity are appealable final
judgments, this encourages their use at this stage. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 (1996).
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The Court has never overturned the burden-shifting framework for
retaliation cases, and it is the preferred framework of Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor, even in Nieves. There is a reason the burden-shifting framework
was created; police officer defendants are in the better position both to prove
the reason for the arrest and their personal motivations, and this account
should be compared to the plaintiffs. There must be more for plaintiffs to
argue than they are statistically unlike other would-be arrestees, a fact that
would be far too difficult to prove. Retaliatory arrest is a cause of action
based on motive. Thus, motive must be alleged, scrutinized, and proven, not
waved away under the objective guise of probable cause. While complex
causation can be an issue, a pleading-focused approach avoids any undue
comparisons to retaliatory prosecutions which always involve a chain of
actors. This approach sharpens the focus in “ordinary retaliation” claims
with cleaner causation where a police officer encounters speech and engages
in a subsequent arrest.
A second benefit to this approach is that it tracks the pleading landscape
of Twombly and Iqbal, because it reinforces the plausible nature of the claim.
It does not allow a plaintiff to allege arrest where it could be true that the arrest
was retaliatory (as any arrest could be) but forces the plaintiff to nudge her
claim from possible to plausible. It could even be true that if a plaintiff did
not allege a lack of probable cause that her burden would be slightly higher,
that to overcome probable cause the allegations of pretext would have to be
weightier. If probable cause itself is an absolute or near-absolute ban, then
complaints never see the light of trial after a cutting 12(b)(6) motion. And
that means that some arrests truly based in pretext go un-remedied and unredressed.
Third, this approach still provides for gatekeeping of trivial claims with
summary judgment. Thus, although keeping the bar low at the initial
complaint stage means that more complaints will see success, the higher bar
of summary judgment can still serve its function by allowing the assessment
of evidentiary support. There can be some discovery and a showing that
either proves the existence or lack of retaliation or provides a genuine issue
of material fact to proceed to a jury. It does not curtail the inquiry by finding
“as a matter of law” that probable cause ends the matter entirely.
Finally, and most importantly, retaining the original elements of the
retaliatory arrest claim allows for recovery when arrests are pretextual, but a
level of probable cause still exists. Although the Supreme Court refused to
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acknowledge this in Reichle, and birthed a qualified immunity roadblock to
retaliatory arrest claims, this can be reversed. Using the original tools in
place, a burden-shifting framework and proper pleading requirements,
plaintiffs can suitably allege a retaliatory arrest. The Supreme Court does
not have to close the door on retaliatory arrest claims when it should be
allowing the judicial system to check any abuse of power in an arresting
officer.

